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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the proposed abolition of the appeal from decisions of 
the New Zealand courts to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. It 
begins with a historical overview of the Privy Council and then briefly 
outlines the competing argument both for and against abolition. The 
conclusion is that abolition is inevitable and that replacement options should 
therefore be considered. Five options are examined, the favoured model 
being a new Supreme Court to be placed above the Court of Appeal in the 
New Zealand court hierarchy. Particular emphasis is placed on innovative 
possibilities that could be utilised in constituting the Supreme Court bench, 
including the use of non-legally trained judges, elected judges and limited 
term appointments. The Maori dimension is also considered and legislation 
to implement all the above suggestions is proposed. The object of the paper is 
to generate debate on the new Supreme Court and to emphasise that new and 
innovative ideas should be fully considered before the constitution of the 
Supreme Court bench is finally decided. 
Word Count: c 14,900 (excluding footnotes) 
The Sovereign, in virtue of the Royal Prerogative, is the 
"Source and Fountain o_f Justice". Hence.follows the right 
that suitors have, in the last resort, to appeal against the 
judgments of the King's Courts in all parts of the Empire. 1 
I INTRODUCTION 
After discussions with interested parties and a report from its Advisory 
Group, the government has recently announced its intention to introduce legislation 
into Parliament later this year to abolish New Zealanders' rights of appeal to the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and replace that avenue of appeal with an 
appeal to a new Supreme Court of New Zealand. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine just one facet of this decision, how 
the Supreme Court bench should be constituted and what the legislation 
establishing the new court should include. Before embarking on this discussion, 
however, a brief background to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council will 
assist in placing the debate in context. I will then outline two important facets of 
the decision to abolish this right of appeal. First, the debate leading up to the 
proposed abolition and why abolition is considered desirable, and secondly the 
appellate models proposed to take the place of the right of appeal to the Privy 
Council and why a new Supreme Court is the favoured option. 
II HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
As the opening quotation makes clear, the genesis of appeals to the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council was that the Monarch is the source of all justice. 
Foreword to the NZPCC (1840-1932), Butterworths, Wellington, 1938 
The Privy Council dates from Norman times2 and today consists of over 300 
members. 3 Its original function was to advise the Sovereign on matters of State, 
but its importance has diminished over the years, particularly through the 
development of the Cabinet system. By convention, however, appointments4 to the 
"modem" Privy Council include all United Kingdom Cabinet ministers5 and also 
some senior members of Commonwealth Cabinets. 6 Members of the Privy Council 
are entitled to prefix the words "Right Honourable" to their names. 7 
This paper is concerned with only part of the Privy Council: its Judicial 
Committee. 8 Members are the Lord President of the Council,9 the Lord Chancellor, 
the Lords of Appeal 10 and other Privy Councillors who have held high judicial 
office. 11 The judges of the New Zealand Court of Appeal are inevitably appointed 
to the Privy Council. 12 The Privy Council usually sits as a bench of five, and its 
decisions are by way of recommendations to Her Majesty. 13 Although in theory Her 
Majesty could reject these Opinions, they are, by convention, never disputed. 
2 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Because the Royal Prerogative "extends to all parts of the Commonwealth of 
For a discussion of the history and development of the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council, see Peter Bums "The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council: Constitutional 
Bulwark or Colonial Remnant?" (1984) 5 Otago LR 503 . 
For a full list see the Privy Council's web site at <http ://www.privy-counciLorg.uk> (last 
accessed 16 May 2002). 
Appointments to the Privy Council are made by the Sovereign and are for life. In practice, 
recommendations are made to Her Majesty by the British Prime Minister. 
See ECS Wade and EW Bradley Constitutional and Administrative Law (10 ed, Longman, 
London, 1985) 243-4 
Including, for example, New Zealand ' s current Prime Minister. 
For a full current list of Privy Councillors, see the Privy Council's website: <http :privy-
councilorg.uk> (last accessed 16 May 2002). 
Simply referred to as "the Privy Council" for the remainder of this paper 
Who does not sit. 
The Lords of Appeal are the same judges that hear House of Lords appeals. 
See s l of the Judicial Committee Act 1833 (UK) and s I of its 1895 amendment. ew 
Zealand judges currently sitting? 
McGrath and Glazerook JJ are yet to be appointed. 
Judicial Committee Act J 833 (UK), s 3. 
2 
which the Queen is monarch as fully in all respects as to England", 14 British settlers 
in New Zealand retained their rights of appeal to the Queen in Council. This appeal 
has existed in legal terms since the foundation of the Supreme Court in 1841. 15 The 
New Zealand Court of Appeal was established in 1862 and, in 1871, provision was 
made for appeals from that court to the Privy Council, although the right of appeal 
directly from the Supreme Court16 still existed. 17 The right of appeal is currently 
governed by two imperial statutes and three Orders in Council. 18 
Although many Commonwealth countries have now abandoned the Privy 
Council appeal, New Zealand retains it. 19 It is perhaps notable that New Zealand is 
the last significant independent country to do so. The remaining countries and 
dependant territories are very small, and probably retain the right because of a lack 
of local resources necessary to establish an effective appeal court in their own 
jurisdiction. Conversely, countries that have now abolished the right of appeal 
include those to which New Zealand has particularly strong connections (both in 
tenns or trade and legal precedent), particularly Australia and Canada. 20 
Some New Zealand statutes expressly state that decisions of the Court of 
Appeal are final 21 in which case both the Court of Appeal and the Privy Council are 
H 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Halsbury 's Laws of England ( 4 ed reissue, Butterworths, London, 1996) vol 8(2), para 3 70. 
Although, due to the enonnous expense and inevitable delay involved in such an appeal, onJy 
two appeals from New Zealand were heard by the Privy Council and in the first 60 years (up 
to 1899) onJy 23 more followed . 
Now known as the High Court . 
The right still exists in some civil matters, although it is rarely exercised. 
The Judicial Committee Act 1833 ; The Judicial Committee Act 1844; The New Zealand 
(Appeals to the Privy Council) Order 191 O; The New Zealand (Appeals to the Privy Council) 
(Amendment) Order 1910; and The Judicial Committee (General Appellate Jurisdiction) Rules 
Order 1982. 
For a full list of countries and dependant territories that have either retained or abolished the 
right of appeal , see Discussion Paper, " Reshaping ew Zealand ' s Appeal Structure", Office of 
the Attorney-General, Wellington, 2000, App 2. 
Canada in 1949 (Supreme Court Act 1949, s 3) and Australia in 1986 (Australia Act 1986, s 
11 ). 
For example, the Resource Management Act 1991, s 308; the Employment Relations Act 
2000, s 214; and the Children Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989, s 347. 
3 
precluded from granting leave to appeal. 22 Subject to that caveat, in civil cases 
where the amount in dispute exceeds NZ$5,000 an appeal to the Privy Council is 
available as of right. 23 In all other civil cases an appeal is subject to the leave of the 
Court of Appeal. 24 In the vast majority of cases the NZ$5,000 threshold will give 
an automatic right of appeal and leave will not be required. Even where leave not 
available as of right and is refused by the Court of Appeal , the Judicial Committee 
itself may grant special leave. 25 
One anomalous situation that merits particular mention is the possibility of 
appeals to the Privy Council directly from the Maori Appellate Court. Under the Te 
Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993, there is no provision rendering the decision of the 
Maori Appellate Court final , but neither is there any right of appeal to any other 
New Zealand Court. It is possible then to seek special leave directly from the Privy 
Council. 26 However, despite authority for the proposition that appeals from the 
Maori Land Court are appealable directly to the Privy Council,27 this "right" of 
appeal is "not clear". 28 Clause 15 of the New Zealand Courts Strncture Bill (1996) 
would (had it passed into law) have put this matter beyond doubt. 29 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
Nunns v LCC [1968) NZLR 57 (CA) 
See Alexander Haslam, "The Judicial Committee - Past Influence and Future Relationships" 
[1972) NZLJ 542, 543 where the author noted that the original amount of 500 pounds (set 
out in the 1860 Order in Council) remained unchanged until the I 970' s. Interestingly, 
NZ$5,000 is within the jurisdiction of the Disputes Tribunal: Disputes Tribunal Act 1988, ss 
10, 13 . 
Privy Council (Judicial Committee) Rules Notice, First Schedule, r 2(b). Leave may be 
granted on the grounds that the case raises issues of "great general or public importance", or if 
it "otherwise" merits an appeal to the Privy Council. 
Again on the basis of general importance: Judicial Committee (General Appellate 
Jurisdiction) Rules Order 1982 (UK), Schedule II, r 2. 
Such an application was made in Te Runanganui O Te Tau Thu O Te Waka A Maui Inc v 
Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board Leave was refused. 
Jn the Will of Wi Mafua (1 908) NZPCC 522; De Morgan v Director-Genera/ of Social 
We(fare [1997) 3 NZLR 385. 
Report of the Attorney-General 's Advisory Group "Replacing the Privy Council: A New 
Supreme Court" Office of the Attorney-General, Wellington, 2002, App C, para 13. 
This clause introduced an amendment to Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 , permitting an 
appeal to the Court of Appeal. An appeal was to be subject to the leave of the Maori Land 
Court or the special leave of the Court of Appeal. The Bill was, of course, predicated on the 
abolition of the Privy Council Appeal, and the Supreme Court legislation should make similar 
4 
In the criminal jurisdiction, there is no right of appeal to the Privy Council. 
The Court of Appeal has no statutory jurisdiction to grant leave and so special 
leave must be sought from the Privy Council itself. 30 Leave is rarely granted: 31 
Her Majesty will not review or interfere with the course of criminal 
proceedings, unless it is shown that, by a disregard of the forms of 
legal process, or by some violation of the principles of natural justice, 
or otherwise, substantial and grave injustice has been done. 
There have been only six New Zealand criminal appeals to the Privy Council 
m the 160 or so years that the appeal has been available. Of these four were 
dismissed, one was allowed and one was withdrawn. At least seven applications for 
special leave to appeal in the criminal jurisdiction have been refused. 32 
III THE ABOLITION DEBATE 
Debate over the appropriateness of a London court33 hearing New Zealand 
appeals has existed since early last century. 34 However, abolition of the right of 
appeal was not possible prior to the passing of the Statute of Westminster of 1931 
(UK). This enactment gave Commonwealth countries the ability to abolish appeals 
to the Privy Council, and New Zealand gained this ability on its adoption of this 
30 
31 
33 
3-1 
provision. A simple amendment to the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 would be required, 
to ensure that it was clear that an appeal could not be made directly to the Supreme Court . 
Nicholls v Registrar C!f the Court of Appeal ( 1998) 12 PRNZ 218 (CA) . 
Re Abraham Mallo,y Di/let! ( 1887) 12 AC 459, 467 (PC). 
These are the reported applications. It is highly likely that there have been other unsuccessful 
applications but, as the Privy Council is not required to give reasons for refusing leave, it 
would be difficult to obtain accurate statistics. For the purposes of this paper, it is sufficient to 
note that, as a general rule, special leave is not generally available for criminal appeals. 
The Privy Council has itself declared that it is a court : Jbra/ebbe v R (1964] AC 900. 
When Williams J criticised the Privy Council as "four strangers sitting 14,000 miles away". 
His Honour went on to describe their " ignorance ... of [New Zealand] history ... legislation . 
[and] practice" and concluded that the Privy Council exhibited "every characteristic of an alien 
tribunal": Wallis v Solicitor-General (1903] AC 173 ; (1903) NZPCC 730. 
5 
statute. 35 
The inevitability of New Zealand abolishing the right of appeal has been 
mooted by many distinguished jurists over the years. For example, Eichelbaum CJ36 
said: 37 
The demise of the Privy Council appeal is inevitable ... The notion that 
a fully self-governing nation should send its litigation for final 
determination to a tribunal sitting in a "foreign" State, composed of 
Judges lacking any intimate knowledge of the New Zealand way of life, 
has become increasingly quaint. 
However, the decision to abolish the right of appeal must, in the end, be a 
political one. The National government came closest to achieving abolition when it 
produced the New Zealand Courts Structure Bill. 38 This Bill did not proceed due 
partly to a change of government and partly because of opposition from New 
Zealand First's Maori Members of Parliament. 39 However, the Bill is indicative of 
the approach to abolition at that time,40 and it is interesting to note that had the Bill 
passed into law, New Zealand would have, as its final appellate court, the Court of 
Appeal. The favoured model now is a Supreme Court. This highlights the need to 
fully consider the options and open up the debate to all New Zealanders. Without 
full consultation, there is the risk of a final appellate court being established on the 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
~o 
By the Statute of Westminster (Adoption) Act 1947 
As he then was. 
Rt Hon Thomas Eichelbaum "Brooding Inhibition - or Guiding Hand? Reflections on the Privy 
Council Appeal" in Philip A Joseph (ed) },!,says on the Constitution (Brookers, Wellington, 
1995) 112. 
Bill No 191-1 , 1996. Ironically, the National party now oppose the abolition of the right of 
appeal to the Privy Council : Wayne Mapp, ational Justice Spokesperson "Replacing Privy 
Council Lacks Support - National" ( 14 April 2002) Media Release. 
Colin James "Scales of Justice in our Hands with end of Privy Council" ( 16 April 2002) The 
New Zealand Herald Auckland, <http ://www.nzherald .co.nz> (last accessed I 7 May 2002) 
The issue of Maori opposition to the abolition of the Privy Council appeal is discussed below. 
R Miller (ed) New Zealand Government and Politics, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 
2001 , at64. 
6 
basis "it seemed like a good idea at the time". The "good idea" in 1996 was the 
Court of Appeal being the final appellate court. It is now the proposed Supreme 
Court. 
A vast amount of debate has taken place on the abolition issue and, although I 
am of the view that abolition is appropriate, it must be noted that there is a fairly 
even balance between the competing "pro" and "anti" abolition lobbies. As an 
example of this fine balance, of the 70 submissions received in response to the 
Attorney-General's recent discussion paper,4 r 32 favoured abolition and an equal 
number favoured retention. The remaining six submissions were described as 
"neutral".42 It is abundantly evident that the arguments represent opposite views: 
the same basic reasons are given both for and against abolition, but different 
conclusions are drawn by each side. 43 There is not, therefore, any great scope for 
41 
42 
43 
Discussion Paper, "Reshaping New Zealand 's Appeal Structure", Office of the Attorney-
General, Wellington, 2000 
Discussion Paper, "Reshaping New Zealand' s Appeal Structure", Office of the Attomey-
General, Wellington, 2000, para 20. 
The arguments for and against abolition have been discussed widely over the years and are 
conveniently summarised in J J McGrath QC, "Appeals to the Privy Council: Report of the 
Solicitor-General to the Cabinet Strategy Committee on Issues of Termination and Court 
Structure", Crown Law Office, Wellington, 1995, I 0-12 . The principal competing arguments 
are as follows : 
For Abolition 
• The appeal is inconsistent with national independence; 
• The appeal results in a public perception of the New Zealand judiciary being less 
able than Privy Council judges; 
• The Privy Council is geographically remote from New Zealand; 
• The appeal inhibits New Zealand in developing its own legal principles; 
• The high quality of New Zealand judges; 
• The high costs of appeals; 
• Links can be maintained through international legal conferences; 
• There is no necessity for two levels of appeal. 
Against abolition 
• The decision to retain the right of appeal is, in itself, an exercise of national 
independence; 
• Separation of the Privy Council judges from ew Zealand allows greater 
detachment from local pressures; 
• The "threat" of an appeal to the Privy Council limits the Court of Appeal's 
willingness to depart from English case law; 
• Appeals to the Privy Council give access to some of the world ' s finest judges; 
• There is no cost to the ew Zealand taxpayer; 
• New Zealand judges are able to sit with the top English judges: 
• There would be insufficient resources in ew Zealand to provide a second level of 
7 
swaying either side with arguments on the merits, and this is perhaps axiomatic. I 
do not propose to rehearse the argwnents here, suffice to say that abolition must, in 
the end, be a matter of government policy. 
In my view, abolition is the clear "winner". It accords with New Zealand 
continuing to develop its own national identity and assert its international 
independence.44 It also reflects the approach of many of New Zealand's 
Commonwealth allies that have already abolished the right. The current 
government's decision to abolish the right of appeal is, in my opinion, both timely 
and appropriate. The remainder of this paper is, therefore, predicated upon the 
assumption that the right of appeal will be abolished. 
The question then, is what will replace the Privy Council? 
IV THE PROPOSED APPEAL MODELS 
The decision to abolish the right of appeal is, in reality, a simple one. At its 
most basic level it can be accomplished by the insertion of one section in the 
Judicature Act 1908.45 Indeed, the New Zealand Courts Structure Bill anticipated 
exactly this. 46 The question in the current debate is, of course, how to replace the 
+I 
46 
appeal. 
The Attorney-General ' s press release announcing the intended abolition of appeals to the 
Privy Council did not refer to this national independence aspect, but rather to easier access to 
the final appellate court (the proposed Supreme Court) and that court's ability to consider a 
wider range of matters : Hon Margaret Wilson, Attorney-General " ew Supreme Court of 
New Zealand Planned" (15 April 2002) Press Statement; <http//www.beehive.govt .nz (last 
accessed 28 August 2002). 
Although other provisions will obviously be required including, for example, to deal with 
references to the Privy Council in other legislation and to state that the relevant Imperial 
legislation shall cease to have effect in New Zealand. 
The relevant clause was drafted as follows : 
70A. Termination of appeals to Her Majesty in Council - (1) o 
appeal to Her Majesty in Council lies or shall be brought, whether by 
leave or special leave of any court or of Her Majesty in Council or 
otherwise, and whether by virtue of any Act of the Parliament of the 
United Kingdom or of New Zealand, the Royal Prerogative or 
otherwise, from or in respect of any criminal or civil decision of a New 
8 
Privy Council appeal in New Zealand. 47 
Canada now looks to its Supreme Court as the ultimate appeal forum, and 
Australia its High Court. Both jurisdictions have at least two levels of appeal and 
that has been a major concern for New Zealand in finding a replacement for the 
Privy Council. The argument is that a first level of appeal deals with the correction 
of error, while the second allows the court to focus on the (legal) policy issues to 
enable clarification and development of the law. The main difficulty in achieving a 
second level of appeal in New Zealand centres on the fact that New Zealand has a 
small population. The question is simply whether this country can afford to replace 
the Privy Council?48 The "economy" option is, of course, to simply have only one 
level of appeal where the matter originates in the High Court, as envisaged by the 
National government in its 1996 Bill. 
In 1994 Mr McGrath QC (the then Solicitor-General) was instructed to report 
to the Cabinet Strategy Committee on the "constitutional, historical, jurisprudential 
and structural issues relating to the appeals to the availability of appeals to the 
Privy Council, including arguments for and against its retention and an evaluation 
of possible alternatives to it". 49 The report concluded:50 
47 
48 
49 
50 
the proposition that a two [tier] appeal system will produce greater 
Zealand Court. 
(2) It is hereby declared that the Court of Appeal is the final appellate 
court of New Zealand and that no further appeal shall lie to any other 
court in respect of any decision of the Court of Appeal. 
The political decision to abolish the right of appeal has now been made. 
The costs of administering the Privy Council are met by the UK Government, so the only cost 
is to the parties. 
Cabinet Strategy Committee paper CSC (94) M 34/4, 5 October 1994. 
J J McGrath QC, "Appeals to the Privy Council Report of the Solicitor-General to the 
Cabinet Strategy Committee on Issues of Termination and Court Structure", Crown Law 
Office, Wellington, 1995, paras 52-54. 
9 
justice in particular cases or a better articulation of the law than will a 
single appeal system is unconvincing ... [there is] an opportunity to 
take advantage of the reductions in delay and cost that come with a 
single right of appeal ... the public and private interest in putting an end 
to litigation outweigh the value of allowing a continuing search to see 
if greater justice can be found . 
The result of this pragmatic report was the introduction, by the National 
party, of its 1996 Bill. As set out above, this Bill did not proceed and appeals to the 
Privy Council continued to be possible. 5 1 
The debate continued and agam came to the political fore in 2000 
culminating in December of that year with the publication of a Discussion Paper. 52 
This paper included "a set of guiding principles" to assist in the discussion. 53 From 
the above papers four possible models emerged,54 all or which firmly placed the 
Court of Appeal at the apex of the New Zealand court system. 
A No Replacement 
51 
52 
53 
This was to have been a simple termination of appeals to the Privy Council, 
And, indeed, have continued to have been pursued. 
Discussion Paper, "Reshaping New Zealand ' s Appeal Structure", Office of the Attomey-
General, Wellington, 2000 
Discussion Paper, "Reshaping New Zealand ' s Appeal Structure", Office of the Attomey-
General, Wellington, 2000, para 25, Appendix 1. These were: 
• recognising the Court of Appeal as New Zealand ' s final appellate court; 
• promoting reflective development of the law 
• recognising Maori values and the interests of Maori under the Treaty of Waitangi 
• reflecting the nature of new Zealand society 
• economic viability 
• meeting the needs of the community 
• maintaining the independence of the judiciary 
• the effective use of resources 
• simplicity 
• efficient administration 
• access to justice 
The 1995 paper proposed all four The 2000 paper omitted the first option, but reiterated the 
other three. 
10 
but was rejected by the Solicitor-General in his 1995 report on the basis the Court 
of Appeal would not be "concentrating its resources on the most important 
cases".
55 
This "do nothing" model is no longer an option, as divisions within the 
Court of Appeal have since been implemented.56 The current "do nothing" option 
would result in the following model. 
B Divisions Within the Court of Appeal 
This option introduced the concept of "divisions" within the Court of Appeal. 
These would consist of three judges each for the criminal and civil divisions, with 
the full bench consisting of five (or seven) judges.57 Whether the appeal was heard 
by a division or the full court, the decision would be final. The decision as to 
whether the appeal was heard by the full court was to be on the basis of the system 
that the judges themselves operated. This model was that envisaged by the New 
Zealand Courts Structure Bill and, in respect of divisions within the Court of 
Appeal, was implemented in 1998. The important point is that the Privy Council 
appeal was retained under the 1998 amendments but, the adoption of this model 
now would, in effect, be the "no replacement" option. 
C Two Levels of Appeal in tlte Court of Appeal 
As in the preceding model, divisions of the Court of Appeal would be 
introduced. Appeals would generally be heard by a divisional court with a possible 
second level of appeal to the full court. A "leapfrog" appeal was envisaged in 
55 
56 
57 
See J J McGrath QC, "Appeals to the Privy Council Report of the Solicitor-General to the 
Cabinet Strategy Committee on Issues of Termination and Court Structure", Crown Law 
Office, Wellington, 1995, para 70.2. 
Divisions of the Court of Appeal were introduced by a 1998 amendment Judicature Act 1908, 
s 58 . 
The Court of Appeal must sit as a full court ( of 5 or 7 judges) when the case is of ·'sufficient 
significance to warrant the consideration of the full court", is referred to it by a divisional 
court (Judicature Act 1908, s 58(6)) or is an appeal from a Court Martial Appeal Court : 
Judicature Act 1908, ss 58D and 58E. 
11 
"landmark or exceptionally urgent and important cases". 58 
D An Appellate Division of the High Court 
This involved the creation of an appellate division of the High Court (a bench 
of three High Court judges) with a second tier of appeal to the Court of Appeal. 
Again a "leapfrog appeal" was envisaged under this model. 59 
E Summary 
The last three models remain available possibilities for when (as now seems 
certain) appeals to the Privy Council are abolished. Model B could be implemented 
without any change to the current system, while models C and D would require 
only a relatively small amount of adaptation to the present structure. The perceived 
difficulty with the latter two models is that judges would be "judging" their peers. 
It seems that this (along with submissions favouring a second level of appeal now 
finding favour) is the reason why a further model has now emerged. 
Interestingly (given the emphasis on Maori views in the later report discussed 
below) the then Solicitor-General did not consult with Maori on the abolition of 
appeals to the Privy Council. He considered that the Privy Council had no special 
legal status or role in relation to Treaty of Waitangi matters. 60 
58 
59 
60 
See J J McGrath QC, "Appeals to the Privy Council Report of the Solicitor-General to the 
Cabinet Strategy Committee on Issues of Termination and Court Structure", Crown Law 
Office, Wellington, 1995, para 70.14; Discussion Paper, "Reshaping New Zealand ' s Appeal 
Structure", Office of the Attorney-General, Wellington, 2000, para 31. 
See J J McGrath QC, "Appeals to the Privy Council: Report of the Solicitor-General to the 
Cabinet Strategy Committee on Issues of Termination and Court Structure", Crown Law 
Office, Wellington, 1995, para 70.20; Discussion Paper, "Reshaping ew Zealand's Appeal 
Structure", Office of the Attorney-General, Wellington, 2000, para 37. 
Although the Solicitor-General noted that ··r am of the view that the Government must confer 
with Maori interests and ensure Ministers are aware of their viewpoint on the Privy Council 
appeal before decisions are made on the government's policy in relation to ending appeals. ": J 
J McGrath QC, "Appeals to the Privy Council: Report of the Solicitor-General to the Cabinet 
12 
F Consultation and a Fifth Option 
In November 2001, the Attorney-General established an Advisory Group 
chaired by the current Solicitor-General, Terence Arnold QC, and this group 
reported back to the Attorney-General in March 2002.61 Its report was prefaced as 
follows: 62 
The Advisory Group was not asked to comment on the desirability of 
abolishing or retaining access to the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council. It was asked to comment on how a court of final appeal above 
an intermediate appellate court might be structured. 
Perhaps the most surpnsmg thing to emerge from the consultation and 
submission process was an option never before seriously considered: a new 
Supreme Court to be placed at the apex of the New Zealand court system.63 In fact, 
this option was actively rejected on several previous occasions, and it is notable 
that the first of the "guiding principles" (above) specifically recognised that the 
current Court of Appeal would be New Zealand's final appellate court. 
Although others consider the name of the court unimportant,64 I think that it 
is a matter of considerable importance and should be given careful consideration. 
The name must reflect the status the new court of final appeal both in New Zealand 
61 
62 
63 
64 
Strategy Committee on Issues of Termination and Court Structure", Crown Law Office, 
Wellington, 1995, para 32. 
The report was published in April 2002 Report of the Attorney-General's Advisory Group 
"Replacing the Privy Council: A New Supreme Court" Office of the Attorney-General, 
Wellington, 2002. 
Report of the Attorney-General's Advisory Group "Replacing the Privy Council: A New 
Supreme Court" Office of the Attorney-General, Wellington, 2002, para 1. 
The name of the new court was arrived at by the Attorney-General's Advisory Group: Report 
of the Attorney-General's Advisory Group "Replacing the Privy Council: A ew Supreme 
Court" Office of the Attorney-General, Wellington, 2002, paras 36-7. 
"The final court of appeal could be called the Supreme Court, or whatever. The name does 
not matter Rt Hon Ted Thomas "Dialogue: Final Court to Reign Supreme" (7 December 
2001) The New Zealand Herald, Auckland, <http ://www.nzherald.co.nz> (last accessed 27 
August 2002) .. 
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and internationally. I would advocate the new court being called the "The 
Supreme65 Court of New Zealand" as I consider it fulfils those expectations. 
G Conclusions on the Debate and the Options for Replacement 
The argwnents both for and against retention of the Privy Council appeal 
have continued for may years, but it appears inevitable that this right of appeal will 
shortly be abolished. It is equally inevitable that, if the current government has its 
way, the appeal will be replaced with appeals to a Supreme Court. Although the 
Supreme Court is an option never before seriously considered, the establishment of 
a court at this level is in line with other similar jurisdictions and is clearly, in my 
view, the best way forward for New Zealand. 
I have considered the obvious additional costs to the taxpayer of introducing 
a new appellate court in New Zealand66 and compared those costs with the other 
mooted options: the "economy" models. Although implementing those economy 
options would involve little cost, it must be borne in mind that fiscal considerations 
should not be a deciding factor, and perhaps not a factor at all.67 The important 
issue is to ensure that the right of appeal is viable and available to all New 
Zealanders. The benefits of a new Supreme Court will serve to satisfy litigants with 
65 
66 
67 
Defined as "of highest status or power" : IA Gordon (ed) The New Collins Condse English 
Dictiona,y: New Zealand Edition (Collins, Auckland, 1982) 1173 . 
These will include infrastructure costs (buildings, staff, judges) as well as the administration 
costs which will be unlikely to be met solely from the court fees payable by the appellants if it 
is to be an accessible court. 
At present there is no cost to the New Zealand taxpayer for appeals to the Privy Council 
except, of course, where the Crown is a party and/or where legal aid has been granted. The 
discussion papers suggest that the average cost where the Crown appeals is approximately 
$100,000 (double if a private litigant) and the Legal Services Board granted legal aid 
payments of approximately $280,000 in 1998-1 999 and a little over $ l 00,000 in 1998-1 999. 
Even assuming that eight (the average number) cases were heard in a year all involving the 
Crown and a private litigant ($300,000 for each appeal) the total cost would be $3m. The cost 
to litigants would remain similar, the only real cost being that of travel and accommodation for 
counsel. The other costs would be similar in a Supreme Court environment. The cost of the 
Supreme Court would be in having more judges and the infrastructure generally. 
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a second level of appeal and also to retain the image of New Zealand's court 
structure as one favourably comparable with other international models. For the 
purposes of this paper, I assume that a Supreme Court will be established. The 
considerations that follow are therefore predicated on that basis. 
V LEGISLATION TO ABOLISH PRIVY COUNCIL APPEALS 
It is immediately obvious that the abolition of appeals to the Privy Council 
from decisions of the New Zealand courts must be implemented by legislation. The 
right of appeal is contained in legislation68 and, as such, that right may only be 
removed by legislation. The question then arises as to what form the enabling 
legislation should take. In this paper I suggest concise and "plain English" 
legislation to deal with the issues arising from the abolition of the Privy Council 
appeal and the establishment of the new Supreme Court. 
The Judicature Act 190 8 currently governs the constitution of the High Court 
and the Court of Appeal. Given the age of that statute and its many amendments it 
is now less than easy to access, except by electronic means. There is considerable 
scope to make that statute more accessible by redrafting some of the more archaic 
and complex provisions, and the proposed changes to the final appellate structure 
in New Zealand would present a good opportunity to revisit and "tidy" that Act. 
There will be various issues in establishing a new Supreme Court that will 
particularly impact on the provisions relating to the Court of Appeal and, in view of 
the necessity to draft new legislation in any event, I propose a new Judicature Act. 
This Act would then deal with the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the 
Supreme Court and should, in my view, be entitled the Judicature Act 2002.69 
68 
69 
Jt should be noted that only some of the "key" sections of the new Act are 
Judicial Committee Act 1833 (UK), s 1. 
Referred to in the paper simply as "the new Act". 
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suggested below. A full and comprehensive draft of the proposed new Act is far 
beyond the scope of this paper but its content will need to be carefully considered 
before final drafting instructions are provided to the Parliamentary Counsel's 
Office. 
In addition to the substantive issues outlined above, other ancillary matters 
must be considered and included in the new Act, particularly the need for 
regulations to deal with Supreme Court fees and Supreme Court rules. I propose 
that the Supreme Court Rules should be based on the current Privy Council Rules, 
but there will be a need to add and amend those rules so as to reflect the 
requirements of a New Zealand based court. Some issues concerning rules are 
discussed in context below but generally are outside the scope of this paper. 
Finally, the new legislation must take account of the need for consequential 
repeals and amendments. A careful analysis of current general legislation70 will be 
required, particularly to deal with references to the Privy Council and the rights of 
final appeal. These are also discussed in context below but again are generally 
outside the scope of this paper. 
In short, the legislation will need to deal with the following basic, but 
essential, matters: 
70 
• Abolish appeals to the Privy Council 
• Establish the Supreme Court of New Zealand 
• State the date the Act will come into force 
• Appeals currently being heard 
• Appeals lodged but not yet heard 
• Precedential status of Privy Council opmrnns m respect of New 
By which I mean all New Zealand Acts and Regulations currently in force . 
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Zealand appeals 
• Consequential repeals and amendments 
I suggest that all these essential issues be dealt with in the following concise 
sections: 
7 1 
XX71 Supreme Court of New Zealand established - (1) The 
Supreme Court of New Zealand is hereby established. This court shall 
be the final appellate court for New Zealand. The decisions of the 
Supreme Court shall, in all New Zealand cases (both civil and 
criminal), be final . 
(2) This Act shall come into force on the [day, month year] 
XX Appeals to Her Majesty in Council abolished - (1) Except as 
provided by paragraph (2) of this section, no appeal to Her Majesty in 
Council may be brought from any decision of any New Zealand Court 
after the commencement of this Act. 
(2) Appeals to Her Majesty in Council may proceed where: 
(a) the appeal has been brought prior to this Act coming into force; or 
(b) prior to this Act coming into force the Court of Appeal has granted 
leave (or the Judicial Committee has granted special leave) to bring the 
appeal. 
(3) As from the commencement of this Act, Opinions of the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council in respect of New Zealand appeals 
shall not bind the Supreme Court nor, where the Court of Appeal is the 
final appellate court, that Court . 
( 4) As from the commencement of this Act, the Imperial Acts and 
Regulations listed in the First Schedule to this Act shall cease to have 
effect in New Zealand: 
"XX" is used in aU my suggested provisions to denote a section number. 
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(5) As from the commencement of this Act, the Acts listed in the 
Second Schedule to this Act shall be amended or repealed in the 
manner set out in that Schedule. 
The remainder of this this paper deals with one major facet of establishing a 
new Supreme Court, namely how it will be constituted and how that should be 
dealt with in the legislation. Before discussing these substantive issues, however, a 
short consideration of the effect the Supreme Court will have on the Court of 
Appeal is appropriate. It is intended to highlight the "knock-on" effect that the new 
court will have on the constitution of the Court of Appeal and propose legislation 
to deal with this. 
VI THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COURT OF APPEAL 
The establishment of the Supreme Court will affect the current Judicature 
Act provisions relating to the judges Court of Appeal and how they sit in a 
relatively limited manner, and the key provisions of the new Act can probably be 
dealt with quite shortly. 
The first matter is how the Court of Appeal should sit. With the introduction 
of the Supreme Court, I consider that the Court of Appeal should no longer be 
pennitted sit as a full bench. 72 Currently, the Court only sits as a full bench where 
the matter before it is:73 
72 
73 
• 
• 
• 
of sufficient significance to warrant the consideration of the Full Court . 
referred to the Full Court if the divisional court considers it "desirable" . 
a decision of the Courts Martial Appeal Court . 
Currently a Full Bench consists of either fi ve of seven judges: Judicature Act 1908, s 58D. 
Judicature Act 1908, s 58D( 4). 
]8 
In my opm1on, the Supreme Court should be given a wide jurisdiction 
(beyond that currently available in appeals to the Privy Council) to enable it to hear 
appeals from all civil and criminal matters, except where specifically limited by 
Parliament. In view of this proposal, the Court of Appeal should only ever sit as a 
bench of three judges (that is, as a divisional bench) because a right of appeal will 
usually
74 
lie to the Supreme Court. Even where the Court of Appeal is expressed in 
the relevant legislation to be the final arbiter a bench of three would, I suggest, be 
appropriate. 75 
Further, I propose that the Supreme Court should only ever sit as a bench of 
five. 
76 
If the Court of Appeal were also able to sit as a bench of five it would 
detract from the status of the Supreme Court as the apex of the New Zealand court 
system. I consider it an important aspect of the court hierarchy that the Supreme 
Court should always be the larger bench, thus adding authority to its decisions and 
also marking the court out to the public as "the" senior New Zealand court. 
The current ability of the Court of Appeal to sit as a full bench should 
therefore be removed. If this is accepted,77 there is scope for reducing the number 
of judges required for that court. However, in view of the enormous amount of 
work currently undertaken by Court of Appeal judges78 and the pressure on those 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
Except where Parliament has specifically limited the right of appeal to a lower court . This is 
currently the situation, for example, in appeals under the Resource Management Act 1991 
where the Court of Appeal is stated in that Act to be the final arbiter: s 308. 
This is basically the current practice. ln the vast majority of cases the Court of Appeal hears 
and determines appeals as a bench of three. 
Except perhaps on leave applications. This is also the conclusion of the Advisory Group : 
Report of the Attorney-General's Advisory Group "Replacing the Privy Council : A ew 
Supreme Court" Office of the Attorney-General, Wellington, 2002, para 82. 
The Advisory Group concluded that the Court of Appeal should retain the right to sit as a 
bench of five, but "should rarely do so". It is not clear in exactly which circumstances it 
should sit as a Full Bench: Report of the Attorney-General's Advisory Group "Replacing the 
Privy Council: A New Supreme Court" Office of the Attorney-General, Wellington, 2002, 
para 82 . 
For example, the Court of Appeal heard a total of 593 appeals in 2001 : Report of the 
Attorney-General ' s Advisory Group "Replacing the Privy Council : A New Supreme Court" 
Office of the Attorney-General , Wellington, 2002, para 170. 
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judges to hear and determine cases I consider that seven Court of Appeal judges79 
should be retained until the full implications on the Court of Appeal's workload 
can be accurately assessed. The current reliance on High Court judges80 also 
suggests that seven Court of Appeal judges is appropriate even though it is likely 
their workload will reduce with the removal of the ability to sit as a full court. 
The seven judges should not include the Chief Justice who, in my opinion, 
should sit only in the Supreme Court. 81 The Chief Justice's administrative role in 
the Court of Appeal should pass to the President of that court. 82 This would be in 
keeping with the Supreme Court being separated from the lower courts. If the Chief 
Justice were responsible for the administrative functions of the Court of Appeal, it 
would tend to suggest a lack of independence between the two senior courts, 
independence being an important part of the public perception of a fair and 
unbiased appeal. 
The retention of seven judges, at least until the actual workload of the Court 
of Appeal is known, would be prudent and ensure that it was adequately resourced 
with a sufficient number of judges to meet the new demands. In the meantime, 
benefits may emerge in tenns of the Court of Appeal having a more manageable 
workload and less need to rely on High Court judges. 
I propose that, if the number of Court of Appeal judges is to remain at seven, 
only one High Court Judge should be pennitted to sit on a divisional bench, and 
then only where no Court of Appeal judge is available. There would of course need 
to be provision to allow two High Court judges to sit in "exceptional" 
79 
80 
81 
82 
Judicature Act 1908, s 57. 
Judicature Act 1908, s 58B. 
Editorial "Interview with Mr Justice Eichelbaum on 12 January 1989" (1989) NZLJ 47. 
Currently Gault P. I would also advocate the appointment of a President of the High Court to 
deal with the administration of that court . 
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circumstances. 83 If High Court judges were used less in the Court of Appeal there 
would also be obvious benefits in the administration of the High Court. 
The main features of the above proposals should be dealt with in the Act as 
follows : 
83 
XX Court of Appeal Judges - (I) There shall be seven High Court 
judges appointed as judges of the Court of Appeal . 
(2) The Governor-General, on the advice of the Attorney-General, 
shall appoint one of those judges to be President of the Court of 
Appeal. 
(3) The President of the Court of Appeal shall be responsible for the 
judicial administration of the Court of Appeal. 
XX Court of Appeal to Sit in Divisions - (!) The Court of Appeal 
shall continue to sit in criminal and civil divisions. 
(2) Each division shall consist of three judges of the Court of Appeal 
and those judges shall be assigned to one or both of those divisions by 
the President of the Court of Appeal. 
(3) The Court of Appeal shall cease to sit as a Full Court. 
XX High Court Judge May Sit as a Temporary Member of the 
Court of Appeal - ( l) A High Court judge may sit as a temporary 
member of a divisional bench, provided that judge has been appointed 
as a temporary member by the President of the Court of Appeal . 
(2) o High Court judge shall sit where a Court of Appeal judge is 
By this I mean where there are insufficient Court of Appeal judges to sit due, for example, to 
illness or leave. The administration of justice would not be served by a rigid mle to allow only 
one High Court judge to sit in such circumstances. 
21 
available. 
(3) Save in exceptional circumstances, no divisional bench shall consist 
of more than one lligh Court judge. 
(4) In no circumstances shall a divisional bench consist of more than 
two lligh Court judges. 
VII THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
The remainder of this paper focuses on the constitution of the Supreme Court 
bench and particularly how the judges should be selected and on what terms they 
should be appointed. I consider that all options for the nwnber, qualifications and 
appointment of judges should be left open for consideration. The introduction of a 
Supreme Court presents New Zealand with a golden opportunity to explore a 
myriad of potential options, including the use of elected judges and non-lawyers on 
the bench. However, this would be a radical departure from the virtually universal 
acceptance that judges should be drawn only from the ranks of lawyers. Having 
said that, this traditional view is now open to challenge in New Zealand, and 
although some of the suggestions that follow may appear "radical" in terms of 
accepted practice, they are none the less viable and, I would argue, pertinent to 
achieving a representative and accountable judiciary. 
A The Advisory Group 's Report 
The Advisory Group' s report is premised on what may be regarded as a 
"traditional " approach to constituting a court. It envisages a Supreme Court 
consisting of a bench of five pennanent judges (including the Chief Justice) all 
appointed by the method outlined below,8-1 but at the same time reducing the 
84 
Report of the Attorney-General 's Advisory Group "Replacing the Privy Council: A New 
22 
number of permanent Court of Appeal judges from seven to six. 85 
B Fundamental Requirements 
My starting point is that the constitution of the Supreme Court bench should 
be wide open. At this early stage nothing should be ruled out. The government must 
ensure that what New Zealand gets is a Supreme Court that is worthy of that name. 
A broad-minded approach will ensure that all possibilities are examined and that 
this opportunity for New Zealand to finally take responsibility for its own ultimate 
appeals and does not result in a "missed opportunity" to be innovative through 
taking an overly conservative approach to the constitution of the new bench. New 
Zealand has the chance to set new international standards with its Supreme Court 
and all possibilities should be carefully considered. Some of the suggestions below 
have been considered by the Advisory Group but, for the reasons I give below, my 
conclusions do not necessarily accord with those views. Other suggestions I make 
in this paper are more novel and were not considered by the Advisory Group. It 
may well be that the Legislature will follow the "traditional" approach to judicial 
appointments, but this paper argues that other suggestions are at least worthy of 
consideration. 
My conclusion is that the Supreme Court should comprise five full time 
judges. However, before discussing the possibilities for the constitution of the 
Supreme Court bench, some discussion of the current judicial appointment process 
is appropriate. The intention is to show how that system works and, more 
85 
Supreme Court" Office of the Attorney-General, Wellington, 2002, para 85 . 
Report of the Attorney-General's Advisory Group "Replacing the Privy Council: A New 
Supreme Court" Office of the Attorney-General, Wellington, 2002, para 196. This presumably 
does not include the Chief Justice and would result in a real reduction of two available Court 
of Appeal judges. Currently, the Chief Justice is a member of the Court of Appeal but is also 
able to sit in the High Court; Judicature Act, s 57(2)(a). If the proposed reduction were 
implemented, it would reduce the number of Court of Appeal judges by 25 percent. It assumes 
that the workload of that court would be manageable, as it would rarely sit as a full bench. 
The likely outcome, however, would be a greater reliance on High Court judges. 
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importantly, to suggest how it could be improved. An improved system could be 
utilised to appoint the crucially important first bench of the Supreme Court. 
C How are judges appointed? 
Currently, appointments to the judicial positions are made ( on the basis of 
merit) by the Governor-General following recommendation by the Attorney-
General. 86 A major consideration in the appointment process is the end result: the 
appointment of judges possessing both integrity and ability. For the purposes of this 
paper, the focus will be on the appointment of Supreme Court judges, but the 
considerations are equally pertinent to the appointment of High Court and Court of 
Appeal judges. 87 Although more transparent than it once was, the appointment 
process is still open to criticism for the elements of "secrecy" that pervade. Steps 
have been taken in recent years to render the process more open and, in 1999, Sir 
Douglas Graham88 introduced the Attorney-General's Judicial Appointments Unit 
and advocated a set of "guiding principles" to be followed in appointing judges. 89 
86 
87 
88 
89 
Judges of the Employment Court and Community Magistrates are appointed on the 
recommendation of the Minister of Justice. Judges of the Maori Land Court and the Maori 
Appellate Court are appointed on the recommendation of the Minister of Maori Affairs: 
Leaflet "High Court Judge Appointments" (The Attorney-General ' s Judicial Appointments 
Unit, Wellington, 1999) 5. 
The Solicitor-General oversees the administrative process regarding the appointment of these 
judges. 
The Attorney-General at that time. 
Leaflet "High Court Judge Appointments" (The Attorney-General ' s Judicial Appointments 
Unit, Wellington, 1999) 2. The Judicial Appointments Unit was established to handle 
"expressions of interest" from those aspiring to the bench. The guiding principles are: 
(i) Clear and publicly identified processes for selection and appointment. 
(ii) Clear and publicly identified criteria against which persons 
considered are assessed. 
(iii) Clear and publicly identified opportunities for expressing an 
interest in appointment. 
(iv) A commitment to actively promoting diversity in the judiciary 
without compromising the principle of merit selection. 
(v) Advertising for expressions of interest, recognising that selection 
should not always be limited to those who have expressed interest. 
( vi) Maintaining, on a confidential database, a register of persons 
interested in appointment. 
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The basic requirement (and the only statutory requirement) is that any 
applicant must have held a practicing certificate for at least seven years.90 It is then 
a question of "suitability" based largely on legal ability, character, personal skills 
and social awareness. 9 1 
The steps to judicial appointment begin with an advertisement for 
expressions of interest with a shortlist of respondents being placed on the Judicial 
Appointment Unit's register. As vacancies arise, the Solicitor-General consults92 
with the Attorney-General, the President of the Court of Appeal, the Chief Justice 
and the Secretary for Justice and seeks input from a range of other interested 
bodies. 
93 
A]] candidates are then "rated" and a list of prospective candidates 
presented to the Attorney-General who then prepares a shortlist. The Solicitor-
General is responsible for carrying out background checks on the candidates. 94 
Once satisfied that the candidate is suitable,95 the Attorney-General fonnally 
advises the Governor-General and the appointment is made. 
This more transparent process marks a welcome improvement to the more 
secretive process used previously. 96 However, it does not go as far as the Judicial 
Commission suggested by the Law Commission,97 nor the even broader group 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
Judicature Act 1908, s 6 
Leaflet ''High Court Judge Appointments" (The Attorney-General's Judicial Appointments 
Unit, Wellington, 1999) 6-7. 
Other possible appointees may be considered at this time, even though they did not respond to 
a request for expressions of interest. 
Including the New Zealand Law Society, District Law Societies, the Criminal Bar 
Association, the Maori Law Society and women lawyers groups. 
Which includes a questionnaire and a declaration that the candidate will not, if successful, 
return to practice at the Bar. The purpose of the checks is to ensure, as far as possible, that 
the candidate is suitable for appointment. 
And, of course, is prepared to accept the appointment. 
Hon Paul East "The Role of the Attorney-General" in Philip A Joseph ( ed) Essays on the 
Constit11tio11 (Brooker' s, Wellington, 1995) 201-2. 
Hon Paul East "The Role of the Attorney-General" in Philip A Joseph ( ed) Essays on the 
Constit11tio11 (Brooker' s, Wellington, 1995) 202 . 
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advocated by Professor Harris: 98 
The ultimate appointing power has to be taken out of the hands of the 
Attorney-General and shared among a wider group that is more 
representative of the community. A specially constituted large Select 
Committee of the House of Representatives could perform this role .. . 
Such a body would be likely to be fairly representative of the 
community ... It goes without saying that Judges should be selected so 
that the spread of gender, race and social background on the Bench 
reflects more closely that in the community. 
I consider that public confidence in judicial appointments is only possible 
with a transparent process and a truly representative range of consultation. I agree 
with Professor Harris that wider consultation is necessary and note that the current 
system envisages consultation only within the legal profession. 
By and large, the system works well in New Zealand and, despite some 
indiscretions highlighted by the media,99 New Zealand judges are of extremely high 
integrity and the selection and appointment system is generally vindicated. 
However, the public perception of the judiciary is often less than what one would 
hope for, 100 and a new system of judicial appointment, perhaps first utilised in 
selecting and appointing the Supreme Court bench, would inevitably assist in 
raising the public perception of the judiciary. 
98 
99 
100 
Bearing the above points in mind, I now examine what I consider to be the 
B V Harris, "The Law-Making Power of the Judiciary" in Philip A Joseph ( ed) Essays on the 
Constitution (Brooker' s, Wellington, 1995) 280 . 
For example, the concerns raised by Judge Beattie' s trial: Vernon Small "Judges to go under 
the spotlight" (3 September 2002) The New Zealand Herald, Auckland, 
<http ://www.nzherald.co .nz> (last accessed 27 August 2002). 
See, for example, Rt Hon S Elias "Judges must work on credibility: Chief Justice" (1 
September 2002) Law Talk ( 484) I , 3-4; Editorial "ChiefJustice: public impression of the role 
of our judges and courts is a cause for serious concern" (March 200 l) Law News (7) 89; and 
(generally) New Zealand Law Commission Striking the Balance: Your Opportunity to Have 
Your Say on the New Zealand Cu11rt System ( ZLC PPS 1, Wellington, 2002). 
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most important aspects of the Supreme Court: the role of the Chief Justice, the 
number of judges required and how, and on what tenns, judges of the Supreme 
Court should be appointed. 101 
D Role of the Chief Justice 
The Chief Justice is the head of the New Zealand judiciary, 102 and there has 
been no dispute that with the introduction of the Supreme Court the position of will 
be retained. The Chief Justice then will be both the senior New Zealand judge and, 
appropriately, the head of the Supreme Court bench. The role of the Chief Justice 
traditionally encompasses four elements: 103 
• Upholding judicial independence. 
• Managing the relationship between the courts and the other branches of 
government. 
• Providing leadership to the judiciary. 
• Administering the operation of the High Court. 
A significant issue to arise from the abolition debate is what the role of the 
Chief Justice should be. The Advisory Group ' s report concludes that the Chief 
Justice should sit only in the Supreme Court, 104 although at present she is able to sit 
in either the High Court or the Court of Appeal. If the report's suggestion were 
adopted, she would preside over the Supreme Court and sit only in that court. In 
addition, she would retain responsibility for the judiciary generally. 
l Ol 
102 
103 
104 
Although the focus of my suggested appointment processes are on the Supreme Court, they 
are equally pertinent to the High Court and the Court of Appeal. 
Judicature Act 1908, s 4. 
Report of the Attorney-General's Advisory Group "Replacing the Privy Council: A ew 
Supreme Court" Office of the Attorney-General, Wellington, 2002 para 96; Editorial 
"Interview with Mr Justice Eichelbaum on 12 January 1989" ( 1989) NZLJ 47. 
Report of the Attorney-General ' s Advisory Group "Replacing the Privy Council A New 
Supreme Court" Office of the Attorney-General, Wellington, 2002, para 105 . 
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The argument that she should be able to sit in any of the courts 105 does have 
its attractions, particularly as it inevitably gives first-hand knowledge of the 
operations of those courts. However, against this must be balanced the role of the 
Supreme Court and the authority that the Chief Justice should have amongst the 
judiciary generally as well as in the eyes of the public. As an example of the 
authority that the Chief Judge should be seen to have, it would be undesirable to 
have her High Court judgments successfully appealed to the Court of Appeal and 
then, as a pennanent member of the Supreme Court, being required to sit in 
judgment on the ultimate appeal from her own initial decision. If she upheld her 
initial decision (which would be expected) it may be seen as a failure to see any 
other viewpoint and the perception that the decision of at least one of the Supreme 
Court judges had been predetermined. 
Conversely, if the Chief Justice were to come to a different conclusion in the 
Supreme Court, that would cast severe doubt on her ability as a first instance 
judge. 106 Similar considerations would likely arise if the decision were made in the 
Court of Appeal. This conundrum is currently avoidable, as the Chief Justice would 
not sit in the Court of Appeal where her own judgment was the subject of the 
appeal. There is a sufficient nwnber of Court of Appeal judges to avoid this. 
In my opinion, the Chief Justice sitting on the High Court or Court of Appeal 
bench would detract from the authority of her position as head of the Supreme 
Court and may also lead to the other undesirable consequences outlined above. To 
permit the Chief Justice to sit only in the Supreme Court would truly place her at 
the pinnacle of the judiciary. It would also enable her to have more time to fully 
consider (along with the other Supreme Court judges) the issues that will inevitably 
come before that court. The issues are likely to be complex in nature and will be 
105 
106 
By which I mean the High Court, the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court . 
Assuming there was nothing new to justify such a departure. Even if there was, the public 
perception of vacillation would tend to remain. 
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demanding on the time of the Chief Justice. This strongly indicates that quite apart 
from any other considerations, she would simply not have time to sit any other than 
the Supreme Court. 
My conclusion is in accordance with the Advisory Group' s report. It is, 
however, appropriate that the Chief Justice should continue (as head of the 
judiciary) to oversee the judiciary generally and to carry on her current non-
administrative responsibilities in this role . Although it would be possible to set out 
the Chief Justice ' s role in legislation, I view this as undesirable. The current 
"conventional" role of the Chief Justice allows flexibility in carrying out her role 
and, importantly, the functions are not encroached on or limited by the legislature. 
The role of the Chief Justice as it is currently understood is quite consonant 
with her sitting only in the Supreme Court. 
E How many judges on the Supreme Court bench? 
I have already discussed what I consider to be the desirable and necessary 
changes to the Court of Appeal. My conclusion was that that court should sit only 
in divisions as benches of three, and the option of sitting as a full bench ( of five or 
seven) should be removed. This leads to the question of how many judges should 
make up the Supreme Court. In view of what I have said above with regard to the 
Court of Appeal , a bench of five for the Supreme Court at all times seems 
appropriate. 107 It will always, quite properly, outnwnber the Court of Appeal. 
The fact that the Court of Appeal would only ever sit as a three judge bench 
would add authority to the decision of the Supreme Court and give finality to the 
107 
Subject to leave applications, where I consider a lesser number of judges would be 
appropriate. This would assist in the effective administration of the Supreme Court, allowing 
two applications to be heard simultaneously if necessary. 
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matter for the parties involved. There is no justification for the Supreme Court to 
sit as a bench of seven but it should always sit as a five judge court on substantive 
appeals. This would serve to both distinguish it from the Court of Appeal in the 
eyes of the public and add authority to its judgments. 
As an additional separation between the appellate courts, the Supreme Court 
judges should sit only in that court. This would emphasise their senior judicial 
standing and would accord with the practice of Court of Appeal judges sitting only 
in that court. 
108 
However, in exceptional circumstances, 109 it may be necessary to 
have a Court of Appeal judge sit on the Supreme Court bench as a temporary 
member. Provision should be made in the new Act for this eventuality, on similar 
lines to the provision allowing High Court judges to sit in the Court of Appeal. 11 0 
However, I do not consider that it would be necessary for a Court of Appeal judge 
to be appointed as a temporary judge of the Supreme Court, but rather pennitted to 
sit on the invitation of the Chief Justice. 
The five-judge bench of the Supreme Court is accepted by the Advisory 
Group, although a sixth member was mooted to cover sickness, leave and other 
such situation. 111 However, I consider this sixth judge unnecessary, principally (and 
contrary to the Advisory Group 's conclusion) because I am attracted to the idea of 
overseas judges being utilised. 112 I also consider that the use of Court of Appeal 
judges on an "exceptional" basis would also remove the need for a sixth Supreme 
Court judge. 
108 
109 
110 
111 
11 2 
With the current exception of the ChiefJustice. 
"Exceptional circumstances" would be similar to those l suggest above with respect to High 
Court judges sitting in the Court of Appeal, namely illness, leave or other indisposition of a 
Supreme Court judge. 
Judicature Act 1908, s 58A. 
Report of the Attorney-General 's Advisory Group "Replacing the Privy Council A New 
Supreme Cowt" Office of the Attorney-General, Wellington, 2002, para 85 . 
I examine the use of overseas judges below. 
30 
I have considered whether it should be permissible for the Supreme Court to 
sit as a bench of three on substantive appeals, 113 but have rejected this proposition 
as I consider it would be undesirable to allow an impression that certain Supreme 
Court decisions are of less authority. This is particularly so where (as is quite 
possible) the decision could have been different with five judges sitting: a 2: 1 
decision in favour of an appellant could have been a 3:2 decision against the 
appellant. 
A bench of three would also likely be seen as "equivalent" to the Court of 
Appeal divisional benches, also sitting as three. Having at least three judges in 
agreement in the Supreme Court adds finality to the matter and is in accord with 
international practice, where the final appellate court is invariably the largest 
bench. 
114 
In my opinion then, the Supreme Court bench should always sit as five, 
although leave applications may justify a smaller quorurn.115 
I consider the number of Supreme Court judges should be dealt with in the 
new Act as follows: 
113 
11 4 
l 15 
XX Judges of the Supreme Court of New Zealand - (1) Subject to 
paragraphs (2) and (3) of this section, the Supreme Court of New 
Zealand shall consist of the Chief Justice of New Zealand and four 
other judges of the Supreme Court . 
The Advisory Group recommended that the court could sit as a bench of less than five in cases 
of emergency if the parties agreed: Report of the Attorney-General ' s Advisory Group 
"Replacing the Privy Council: A New Supreme Court" Office of the Attorney-General, 
Wellington, 2002, para 94. However, I consider that this would be undesirable given the 
precedential value that Supreme Court decisions will inevitably have. 
For example the House of Lords, the Supreme Court of Canada and the High Court of 
Australia. 
I think that the issue of leave applications should be left to the discretion of the Supreme 
Court. This should include the grounds on which leave should be granted and the number of 
judges that hear the application. I would envisage this could range from one judge (where the 
permissible grounds of appeal have been clearly set out by the court on previous occasions) to 
a full court (where the issue in question is novel or raises points that warrant consideration by 
the full court) 
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(2) In exceptional circumstances, the Chief Justice may invite a Court 
of Appeal judge to sit as a temporary member of the Supreme Court 
bench, but in no circumstances shall more than one Court of Appeal 
judge sit on that bench. 
(3) Subject to section XX, 116 an overseas judge of a senior overseas 
appellate court117 may sit on the Supreme Court bench.11 8 
F Tenure of Supreme Court Judges 11 9 
The Advisory Group considered both the length of tenure and the retirement 
age of Supreme Court judges, but did not form an opinion on those matters, instead 
deferring it for future consideration. 120 However, I intend to draw conclusions on 
these and other related issues. 
This section, then, considers how and on what terms the Supreme Court 
judges should be appointed (or as I propose below, elected) to the bench. Again, 
there are a variety of options, none of which can be readily rejected. 
The first possibility is obviously to appoint Supreme Court judges on the 
same basis as other judges of the High Court and the Court of Appeal. 12 1 If that 
were the case, Supreme Court judges would have "a job for life" , or at least 
116 
117 
11 8 
119 
120 
121 
This is the section set out at the conclusion of my discussion on the use of overseas judges, 
below. 
These terms should be defined, with "overseas judge" including retired judges and "overseas 
appellate court" meaning a court listed in the definition. These should include, as a minimum, 
the House of Lords, the Supreme Court of Canada and the High Court of Australia. 
Time limitations may be required to exclude the possibility of an overseas judge becoming a 
"quasi" permanent Supreme Court judge. This should be dealt with in Rules rather than in the 
legislation, thereby avoiding a too prescriptive regime. 
In this paper I advocate consideration of judicial elections. However, even if that suggestion 
were to be adopted, the appointments process would, in my view, still be appropriate for the 
pre-selection of candidates for judicial election. 
Report of the Attorney-General ' s Advisory Group "Replacing the Privy Council: A New 
Supreme Court" Office of the Attorney-General, Wellington, 2002, para 132. 
Leaflet "High Court Judge Appointments" (The Attorney-General ' s Judicial Appointments 
Unit, Wellington, 1999) 6-7. Judicature Act 1908, ss 6, 57(3) 
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(barring the exceptional step being taken to remove them122) until they reached 
retirement age. 123 This would be a simple option and would be in accord with the 
judges of the other New Zealand courts, and would ensure (as far as possible) that 
the following concerns were addressed: 124 
If Judges do not have security of tenure, then there is a danger they 
will tailor their rulings to please the person who can terminate their 
position. If Judges do not have financial security, then they may be 
tempted to accept favours or the promise of future favours from those 
who have an interest in the litigation. And if Judges do not have a 
measure of institutional independence over at least the exercise of the 
judicial function, then the government can, for example, control which 
judges will hear which cases. 
I do not think that there is any firm basis for these concerns. Tenure, security 
and independence are certainly crucial elements, but there is no reason why they 
cannot achieved by means other than life appointments. 
A number of issues arise in retaining the current appointment scheme, and 
perhaps a preliminary consideration is why there should be a retirement age to limit 
some of New Zealand's finest judges and prevent them continuing to sit where the 
only impediment is an arbitrary age limit. 125 The Supreme Court legislation could 
be an opportunity to remedy this situation, at least with respect to the Supreme 
122 
123 
124 
125 
Constitution Act 1986, s 23 . 
Judicature Act 1908, s 13. 
"A Place Apart : Judicial Independence and Accountability in Canada" (1 995) Canadian 
Judicial Council 2 cited in Report of the Attorney-General's Advisory Group "Replacing the 
Privy Council: A New Supreme Court" Office of the Attorney-General, Wellington, 2002, 
para 126. 
For example, the vast experience of Richardson P has been lost to the New Zealand judiciary 
merely because of his age. This compulsory retirement age was reduced from 72 years to 68 
years in 1981: Judicature Amendment Act 1981 , s 3(1). There is a clear conflict between this 
provision and the (later) Human Rights Act J 993 (s 2 J) See, for general discussion, J 
McLean "Equality and Anti-Discrimination Law: Are they the Same?" in G Huscroft and P 
Rishworth (eds) Rights and Freedoms (Brooker' s, Wellington, 1995) 263 . 
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Court. There could be provision to enable judges to continue to sit with no limit on 
age subject, of course, to them being able and willing to do so. 
Conversely, while attractive on the face of it, I consider this proposition 
undesirable in practice. It would likely lead to "stagnation", as a bench could 
remain in place for many years with no prospect (short of voluntary retirement, 
illness or death of the incumbent judge) of new judges being introduced. The 
compulsory removal of such judges would also likely be extremely contentious and 
with a judge resistant to removal the issue could become an embarrassment to both 
the judiciary and Parliament, thereby lowering the standing of the judiciary in the 
community. My conclusion is that the retirement age of 68 years should remain. 
Allied to this is a point left open by the Advisory Group: whether it would be 
feasible to appoint judges to the Supreme Court for a set number of years. This 
could be achieved by way of limited tenn appointments of judges from the Court of 
Appeal or the lligh Court126 to the Supreme Court, or even directly from practice to 
the Supreme Court. 127 
There is certainly validity in the argument that it would be undesirable to 
have a practitioner appointed to New Zealand' s ultimate court with no judicial 
experience but, in my opinion, the possibility should certainly be available. 128 It is 
important to note that one of the major concerns raised in opposition to the 
abolition of the Privy Council appeal is the lack of judicial talent in New Zealand. 
Given the relatively small pool from which judges can potentially be drawn, there 
is a real risk that a sufficient number of able judges would simply be unavailable to 
fill the bench. Further, I can see positive benefits of practitioners with current, and 
126 
127 
128 
The "promotion" model. 
A similar system operates in respect of High Court Masters. Appointments are for initial terms 
of up to five years, with the possibility ofreappointment: Judicature Act 1908, s26C. 
Such appointment is currently possible in relation to Court of Appeal appointments: 
Judicature Act 1908, s 57(3). 
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often expert, technical knowledge being utilised at senior appellate level even in 
the absence of judicial experience. 
I consider that the "promotion" model would also tend to limit the 
introduction of "new blood" to the Supreme Court bench and perhaps promoting 
from within the judiciary as a first choice would limit the choices too far. The key 
consideration must be to ensure that the Supreme Court bench comprises the very 
best available judges. Several recent Privy Council appeals have resulted in 
Opinions that directly contradict the New Zealand Court of Appeal129 and if the 
Court of Appeal was simply wrong (as opposed to there being a difference of 
judicial interpretation of the law) then doubt must be cast on the desirability of 
those same judges sitting in the Supreme Court. 
Limited term appointments would have the decided benefit of overcoming 
the problems set out above, and particularly ensuring that judges could not exist in 
an ivory tower, becoming isolated from the community they should represent. This 
isolation would likely be more accentuated at senior appellate level, where it is 
quite conceivable that many appeals would be decided on the basis of "pure" legal 
argument without the court hearing the litigants themselves or their witnesses. 
A fixed term appointment would assist in preventing this from occurring and 
also enable "new blood" to be introduced to the bench from time to time without 
the wait for retirement or death of the incumbent judge. A further benefit would be 
the enhanced perception in the eyes of the community of a merit-based bench 
serving the community and, importantly, retaining empathy with that community 
129 Most recently in A v Bottrill [2002] UK.PC 44 Gudgement was delivered on 6 September 
2002). For criticism of the Privy Council by a former ew Zealand Court of Appeal judge (Rt 
Hon T Thomas), see B Fallow "Judge slams Lord Lords ' role" (23 May 200 I) The New 
Zealand Herald, Auckland, <http://www.nzherald .co.nz> (last accessed 27 August 2002); Rt 
Hon T Thomas "Dialogue: UK court ignores the way things are" (6 December 2001) The New 
Zealand Herald, Auckland, <http://www.nzherald co nz> (last accessed 27 August 2002). 
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and reflecting its values. 
The detriments of limited term appointments are readily evident but not 
difficult to overcome. 
130 
The principal barrier would be attracting candidates who 
would be prepared to accept such an appointment with the knowledge that it would 
not be a 'job for life". This could be overcome, as Professor Harris suggests, by 
offering an increase in salary and, I would add, it would be possible to offset this 
increase in salary against the reduction in superannuation payments made to 
retiring judges. The return to practice of judges at the end of their term of 
appointment should present no real problem 131 and loss of status is something that 
the appointee would be aware of in accepting the position and would, in any event, 
be likely to be experienced by any retiring judge. 
In summary, I would advocate the introduction of limited term appointments 
to the Supreme Court bench. I consider that a term of perhaps seven years would be 
appropriate
132 
with the possibility of extensions where appropriate. The following 
provision sets out the essential matters, with the selection and appointment process 
being left either to an appointments committee: 
130 
13 1 
132 
XX Appointment of Judges of the Supreme Court of New Zealand 
- (1) Judges shall be appointed to the Supreme Court of New Zealand 
for a term of seven years. 
(2) Judges of the Supreme Court may be reappointed for further 
periods of seven years. 
(3) Subject to subsection (2), upon the expiry of the time set out in 
B V Harris, "The Law-Making Power of the Judiciary" in Philip A Joseph ( ed) E~says on the 
Constitution (Brooker' s, Wellington, 1995) 281-2 
Although the current practice of requiring a candidate to sign a declaration that he or she will 
not return to practice, would need to be removed 
This term being long enough to ensure that collegiality could exist and not so long as to run 
the risk of stagnation. 
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subsection (l) the Judge must retire from Supreme Court and may 
return to his or her previous occupation or practice. 
( 4) All judges of the Supreme Court must retire on reaching the age of 
68 years. 
If this system of limited term appointments were to be implemented, it would 
obviously need to be applied to all other courts at the same time. This would avoid 
the obvious reluctance of sitting judges to be appointed to the Supreme Court 
bench on less advantageous tenns to those that they currently enjoy. The suggestion 
that I make above regarding higher salaries payable to Supreme Court judges may 
alleviate this problem in part, but more work will need to be undertaken on a 
judiciary-wide basis before such a system is finally implemented. 
G Appointment of non-lawyers 
What may perhaps be regarded as a fundamental limitation on the current 
judicial appointments system is the fact that it is predicated on the assumption that 
lawyers are the only ones able to carry out the functions and duties of judges. There 
is obviously a great deal of logic in appointing judges from a pool of experienced 
lawyers. Lawyers hold themselves out as being expert in interpreting and applying 
the law and are arguably the most able people to perfonn the role of judges. 
On closer scrutiny, though, this argument is less clear cut. In the modern 
world of business and commerce, law practices are beginning to show a trend 
towards developing into multidisciplinary organisations, joining partnership with 
finns of accountants (for example) and thus being able to offer their clients a range 
of business-related services within the one finn. There are currently strict limits on 
the extent to which such firms can operate (and whether they can in fact operate at 
all in), but the trend is certainly towards such amalgamations. In view of such 
developments, it will become more and more difficult to sustain the argument that 
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judges may be drawn from the ranks of lawyers alone. 
Even within the legal fraternity, the range of potential appointees to the 
bench is being widened. At one time, it was an invariable rule that only barristers 
would be appointed as judges, and this makes a degree of sense as not all solicitors 
would have the requisite litigation skills and knowledge to be able to sit in 
judgment of cases before them. However, that was never a valid reason for 
excluding those who did have such skills. It is now possible for solicitors and law 
professors to be appointed to the bench and Judges have now been appointed from 
these groups. 
133 
Although such appointees will usually possess the requisite 
litigation skills, it is quite possible for a purely "commercial" lawyer134 to be 
appointed to the bench and then be required to sit in judgment over complex 
criminal trials, having little or no recent experience in such matters. The same can 
be said of a law professor, perhaps with little or no experience of litigation but a 
wealth of experience in analysing the law. 
It becomes, then, a more compelling argument to say that an accountant (to 
give but one example) should be permitted to be considered for appointment to the 
bench. An accountant would be very likely to be fully conversant with tax and other 
financial legislation and, importantly, be expert in applying the rules to their clients 
proposed transactions. This is particularly pertinent to the Privy Council appeal 
where many of the cases are commercially orientated. It is highly likely that a 
significant number of the Supreme Court appeals will also be so orientated. In 
practice, lawyers will frequently seek the advice of such professionals where they 
themselves lack such skill. 
133 
13..1 
In short, a valid argument can be made for extending the ambit of those 
Hon Paul East "The Role of the Attorney-General" in Philip A Joseph (ed) Essays on the 
Co11stit11lio11 (Brooker ' s, Wellington, 1995) 202. 
By which I mean not dealing with litigation. 
38 
eligible for appointment to the bench to a wider category of professionals. 135 In the 
context of the Supreme Court this may make good sense. It could be used to ensure 
that an even balance of professionals was represented at the pinnacle of the New 
Zealand court system and that a vast depth of knowledge in specialist areas would 
be available to detennine the cases before the court. Being a "world first" in 
introducing such a system would place New Zealand in the forefront of 
international legal trends and obviously caution would be required before 
implementing such a system. However, the benefits are obvious: wider professional 
representation in the courts, depth of expert knowledge, a more equitable 
appointment process, professional expert input and, importantly, a wider pool of 
potential appointees. 
One of the arguments for the retention of the Privy Council appeal (above) is 
that there are simply not enough able judges in New Zealand. This is, of course, 
easily refutable, but at least one commentator has based his argument for the lack 
of able judges on a per capita basis. In this article, the editor gives bland statistics 
to support his "one in five million" argument, the essence of the thesis being that 
each Lord of Appeal represents approximately five million citizens in the United 
Kingdom. On that basis, New Zealand would be able to muster less than one judge 
of the quality found in the House of Lords. 136 Whether this is a sustainable 
argument is a moot point, but by introducing a wider pool of potential candidates 
for appointment, the statistical bias is certainly reduced. 
Any arguments as to the inappropriateness of non-legal professionals being 
appointed as judges can readily be dismissed by reference to other New Zealand 
(quasi) judicial tribunals, such a the Housing Tribunal, the Disputes Tribunal and 
13 5 
136 
Professor Harris has also alluded to this ·'provocative" suggestion: B V Harris, .. The Law-
Making Power of the Judiciary" in Philip A Joseph (ed) Essays on the Constitution 
(Brooker' s, Wellington, 1995) 282 
Editorial "One in Five Million" (2001) NZLJ 89. 
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many other such bodies. Although the amounts of money involved are often 
relatively small, it must be remembered that the current limit for an appeal as of 
right to the Privy Council is $5,000: less than the jurisdiction of the Disputes 
Tribunal.
137 
In its recent discussion paper, 138 the Law Commission has invited 
comment on the structure of the courts and, although specifically not dealing with 
the proposed abolition of the Privy Council appeal, its general thrust is that 
fonnality in the justice system should be reduced. I think it quite proper to extend 
this ethos to the selection and appointment of judges and there seems to be no 
rational reason to exclude non-legal professionals from being considered as 
judges. 139 
The fact that it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will hear many criminal 
appeals,
140 
adds force to the possibility of non-legally qualified professionals being 
appointed. However, even where the case before the court is a criminal matter, 
there is no reason why a psychiatrist (for example) should not make as good a 
criminal judge as a commercial lawyer. 
I have suggested legislation that would allow (although not require) the 
appointment of one non-legal professional to the Supreme Court bench. I advocate 
only one appointment on the basis that it will still be desirable to have the majority 
of the bench made up of professional lawyers, well-versed in legal analysis. 
137 
138 
139 
140 
The criteria to be applied in selecting non-legally qualified candidates would 
Currently $12,000: Disputes Tribunal Act 1988, ss 10, l3. 
New Zealand Law Commission Striking the Balance: Your Opportunity to Have Your Say on 
the New Zealand Court System (NZLC PP51 , Wellington, 2002). 
For example, the New Zealand Law Commission Preliminary Paper refers to the number of 
legally qualified judicial officers acting as Disputes Tribunal referees (16 out of a total of 59) 
and Coroners (54 out of64). The clear implication is that there are many non-qualified judicial 
officers making judicial decision in New Zealand, evidently without problem. ew Zealand 
Law Commission Striking the Balance: Your Opportunity to Have Your Say on the New 
Zealand Court System (NZLC PP51, Wellington, 2002) 30-32. 
I base this on the current Privy Council approach to criminal appeals 
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require considerable work by those responsible for the appointment of judges and I 
fully appreciate there will be enormous hurdles to overcome. However, there is no 
insurmountable reason why, in appropriate circumstances, such an appointment 
could not be made, and suggest the following provision: 
XX Appointment of non-legally qualified persons as judges of the 
Supreme Court - (1) A non-legally qualified person 14 1 may be 
appointed as a judge of the Supreme Court. 
(2) The Supreme Court shall include not more than one non-legally 
qualified person. 
The use of professional and specialist advisers should be available to assist 
the Supreme Court. This is a non-contentious suggestion, however, and is currently 
available to both the High Court and the Court of Appeal. 142 I would propose that 
these provisions be extended to include the Supreme Court. 
H Elected judges 
The election of judges is, perhaps, the most contentious suggestion I make in 
this paper. However, I consider there is no reason why elections should not be 
pennitted, even if only to the Supreme Court. 
I fully appreciate the likely resistance to the concept of elected judges in New 
Zealand but see no overwhelming problem in introducing such a system, even at 
senior appellate level , and I consider the concept is worthy of further consideration. 
The challenge will be to design a process whereby there can be a pre-selection 
process to ensure that all candidates are worthy of appointment even without 
1-11 
1-12 
This term should be defined to comprise members specific professional groups, who have held 
the appropriate practicing certificate for that profession for a minimum of seven years . 
Judicature Act J 908, s 99. 
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elections and then to design safeguards to exclude partisan election "campaigns" 
and the making of statements that would be likely to mislead electors. 
It should be noted at the outset of this discussion that this suggestion is an 
alternative to the appointment process discussed above. However, if judicial 
elections were to be implemented in New Zealand the appointment process would 
remain an important tool in the "screening" of potential candidates to ensure that 
only suitably qualified and experienced persons could stand for election. With this 
proviso in mind I consider whether the election of judges to the Supreme Court 
bench would be viable. Before doing so it is appropriate to place the discussion in 
context by considering the operation of judicial election processes overseas. 
There are few jurisdictions where judicial elections are conducted, 143 but the 
notable example is the United States of America. As State courts vary and not all 
States have judicial elections, I have selected the State of Ohio as representative of 
how judicial elections operate. 144 The intention is to highlight the advantages and 
disadvantages of such a system, and to discuss whether it would be appropriate for 
electingjudges to the Supreme Court bench. 145 
In Ohio, there are three trial 146 and two appellate courts. 147 The election 
process is similar for judges of each of the courts, but there are some differences. In 
particular, election to the lower courts is by peer vote 148 and the candidate must be 
143 
144 
145 
146 
147 
148 
American Bar Association "Report and Recommendations of the Task force on Lawyers' 
Political Contributions: Part II" ( 1998, Chicago) 4. This may be a telling reason for not 
introducing such a system to New Zealand! 
For more information on State judicial elections, see <http ://www.ajs.org.us> (last accessed 
13 September 2002). 
Elections are not used for the Supreme Court of the United States. Instead, judges are 
appointed by Presidential nomination, with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
The Court of Common Pleas, the County Court and the Municipal Court. 
The Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Ohio. 
Meaning other judges. 
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resident in the appropriate county or district. 149 I do not consider that a residency 
requirement would be appropriate for candidates standing for election to the 
Supreme Court of New Zealand, due mainly to the national coverage of the 
court.150 In addition, I consider that peer votes should not be the method of election 
for the very obvious reason that this would not instil public confidence in the 
judiciary, but rather lead to the perception that judges were accountable only to 
themselves. 
The criteria that must be met before an Ohio candidate may stand for election 
to the judiciary is quite simple: the candidate must have practiced law for at least 
six years and be under 70 years of age at the date of the election. 151 There is no pre-
selection process in Ohio 152 and so all suitably qualified candidates are entitled to 
stand for election. However, there are rules governing the conduct of campaigns, 
particularly regarding the making of inappropriate or misleading statements or 
personally soliciting or receiving campaign funds . 153 Elections are non-partisan, 154 
but many interest groups promote their candidate and can have a significant effect 
on the outcome of the election.155 This raises the spectre of judges becoming 
"mouthpieces" for their supporters and the diminution of judicial independence. 
149 
150 
151 
152 
153 
15~ 
155 
This reflects the electorate for the Court of Appeals (district based) candidates must be 
resident in that district, while for the Court of Common Pleas ( county based) candidates must 
be resident in the relevant county. 
However, if elections were to be adopted for High and District Courts, residency requirements 
would be more viable. 
The residency criterion described above is, of course, also relevant. These are not dissimilar to 
New Zealand requirements for consideration for appointment to the High Court discussed 
above. 
Although some States do have a panel to prepare a shortlist: see, for example, New Jersey. 
Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 7. The amount of money expended on Ohio judicial 
elections to the Supreme Court is limited to US$350,000 ( candidates for Associate Justices) 
or US$500,000 ( candidates for the Chief Justice) . 
By which [ mean that the candidates may not be endorsed by a political party. 
As an example of the influence of interest groups, in 2000 the Ohio Chamber of Commerce 
identified Justice Resnick (a candidate for re-election to the Supreme Court) as the least "pro-business" judge on the bench. On this basis, business interest groups spent considerable 
amounts of money in attempting to defeat Justice Resnick. Other groups supported the judge, 
however, and ultimately he was re-elected, albeit by a narrow margin. 
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Once Ohio judicial candidates have established that they are qualified to 
stand for election, they campaign for vacant positions on the bench. 156 Interim 
vacancies are temporarily filled by gubernatorial appointments.157 Appointment is 
by a simple majority and the initial term of office, for the Supreme Court, is six 
years.
158 
In all courts, re-election is for six years. 
It is opportune at this point to highlight the "evils" of judicial elections. 
These have beert identified as: 159 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Instability 
Campaign Finance abuse 
Diluted integrity 
Perception of attorneys "buying judicial favours 160 
Undennining the role of the judiciary by inappropriate campaign 
speeches and behaviour 
• Re-election diminishingjudicial independence in decisions161 
The American Bar Association has suggested the following measures to 
counter the above concerns: 162 
156 
157 
158 
159 
160 
16 1 
16'.! 
• Amend the Code of Judicial Conduct 
• Help voters make informed decisions 
Which may arise as a result of a sitting judge retiiing, dying or being removed from office. 
Sitting judges seeking re-election campaign along with all other candidates. 
Meaning appointment by the State Governor. 
Initial appointment is for one year in the lower courts. 
Memorandum of the National Center for State Courts, "Judicial Elections and Judicial 
Independence Concerns" <http ://www.ncsc.dni .us> (last accessed 6 September 2002). 
Through support of a particular candidate. 
Research suggests that risk on failing in a re-election bid may have an influence on the judge' s 
decisions . Uelman suggests that a death penalty conviction is more likely to be overturned 
where the tenure of the judge is secure: see G F Uelman "The Fattest Crocodile: Why Elected 
Judges Can' t Ignore Public Opinion" ( 1998) Criminal Justice, 6. 
American Bar Association "Report and Recommendations of the Task force on Lawyers ' 
Political Contributions: Part II" ( 1998, Chicago). 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
"Connect" with the community 
Ensure best campaign practices are followed 
Reform the election process 
Continue voter research 
It is readily evident that elections can be fraught with difficulties, the most 
pressing being the risk of a diminution of judicial independence, particularly the 
possibility of influence by those prepared to finance or endorse a candidate and the 
risk of judgments reflecting popular opinion rather than an objective application of 
the law. 
However, I consider that none of these problems are insurmountable, 
particularly if pre-selection of candidates were to be included in the process. A 
selection committee could be formed to include many of the considerations 
currently utilised in judicial appointments, but the constitution of the committee 
should better reflect the community. 163 
There are certainly possible benefits in having an elected Supreme Court 
bench, not least the positive impact it would likely have in the eyes of the general 
public. There would be choice, as in Parliamentary and local authority elections, 
and judges would certainly be more accountable for their actions and decisions. 
Their continuing tenure would be dependant on convincing voters of their ability, 
and as part of their "electioneering" they would necessarily meet a wide cross-
section of the public and hear, first-hand, their views. This would serve the dual 
purpose of educating the public and of demystifying the law. It would also ensure 
that non-performing judges did not remain in office indefinitely. 
163 Including a cross section of political and social viewpoints, to ensure (as far as possible) that 
candidates are both worthy of judicial employment if they should be successful and 
representative of the community at large. 
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I have also considered the issue of non-lawyers being elected and conclude 
that this could also work. As I discuss above, only one non-lawyer should be on the 
bench at any time, and so non-lawyers should only be permitted to stand for 
election when the "non-legal" judge was required to stand for re-election or 
otherwise left the bench. Lawyers would also be able to contest this vacancy. 164 I 
discuss the use of overseas judges below, but this will have no effect on the 
election process. I consider it imperative that enforceable rules are introduced to 
deal with the shortcomings identified in the Ohio model, but these should be 
formulated outside the legislation to allow for more flexibility. I have stated seven 
year tenns of office to avoid "stagnation" on the bench and to make appointment 
more attractive to candidates considering a return to practice after the term of 
office expires. 
I am attracted to the concept of national elections for judicial appointments 
to the Supreme Court of New Zealand: I consider they would reinforce the 
perception that the judiciary is accountable to the public (through elections) and 
also give the public a "voice" in deciding the constitution of the judiciary. Any 
perceived logistical problems in conducting an election could be overcome by 
running judicial elections as an adjunct to local and/or general elections. 165 In any 
event, judicial elections would involve far less organisation than general or local 
elections, and could be operated independently if required. 
However, the problems identified above firmly lead me to the 
conclusion that the introduction of judicial elections in New Zealand would require 
very careful consideration and the risks of diminution of judicial independence may 
well be the deciding factor in rejecting this proposal. However, if the practical 
problems identified above can be overcome, the fol lowing provisions would be apt 
164 
165 
My suggested legislation advocates an option (not a requirement) to appoint non-lawyers. 
lt is likely that judicial elections would be embraced by voters : New Zealand has a history of 
relatively high voter turnout for both local and general elections. 
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to implement the election process: 
XX Election of Supreme Court judges - (1) Candidates may stand 
for election to the Supreme Court bench where one of the sitting 
judges 
(a) retires, dies, or otherwise leaves the bench: or 
(b) is required to stand for re-election. 
(2) No candidate may stand for election unless that candidate has 
shown, to the satisfaction of the election committee, that he or she 
possesses the skill, integrity and ability to perform the office of a judge 
of the Supreme Court. 
(3) Election shall be by way of a national ballot, with the successful 
candidate being the one winning the most votes. 
(4) Successful candidates shall be appointed to the Supreme Court 
bench by the Governor-General by Order in Council and shall, subject 
to any other enactment, serve an initial term of seven years. 
(5) On reaching the end of his or her initial term, a judge may stand for 
re-election for a further term or terms of seven years. 
(6) The Judicial Elections Rules shall apply to all candidates 
campaigning for election to the Supreme Court. 
The appointment regime described above should be used to pre-select 
candidates for election and the current rules regarding the removal of judges 
retained.
166 
In addition, strict rules relating to the conduct of candidates should be 
introduced. However, I reiterate that the crucially important point will be to ensure 
that the system is "policed" so that there is no detriment to judicial independence. 
166 
Constitution Act 1986, ss23 , 24 . 
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There are many issues to be worked through in relation to an elected judiciary 
in New Zealand, and these are outside the scope of this paper. Suffice to say at this 
point, the possibility of elections should not be discounted. 
I Overseas judges 
The issue of using overseas judges on the Supreme Court bench was raised by 
the Attorney-General in her Discussion Paper. 167 The arguments for and against the 
use of such judges on the Supreme Court bench was considered by the Advisory 
Group, and its report recommended that overseas judges should not be appointed to 
the Supreme Court.
168 
This was on several bases, including sufficiency of judicial 
talent in New Zealand, collegiality being undennined, problems with selecting 
judges and of operating a court including overseas judges. 169 
However, having considered the arguments against the use of overseas 
judges, I see no reason why it could not work and suggest that such a system should 
be implemented. I am particularly attracted to the comments of Lord Cooke of 
Thomdon, who has advocated the inclusion of overseas judges on the bench of the 
Supreme Court both to add depth and overseas experience to the bench and to 
permit New Zealand judges to be in a position to exchange ideas with overseas 
colleagues. 170 
167 
168 
169 
170 
Discussion Paper, "Reshaping New Zealand's Appeal Structure", Office of the Attorney-
General, Wellington, 2000, JO. This paper preceded the introduction of the Supreme Court as 
an option to replace the Privy Council. 
Report of the Attorney-General's Advisory Group "Replacing the Privy Council: A New 
Supreme Court" Office of the Attorney-General, Wellington, 2002, 36. 
The press have also taken this general tack. See, for example, Colin Keating "Dialogue: We 
have the skills to stand alone" (4 December 2001) The New Zealand Herald, Auckland, 
<http ://www.nzherald co nz> (last accessed 27 August 2001); Michael Barnett "Dialogue: 
Imported judges can 't replace London skills" (7 December 2001) The New Zealand Herald, 
Auckland, <http://www.nzherald .co.nz> (last accessed 27 August 2001); and Rt Hon Ted 
Thomas "Dialogue: Final court to reign supreme" (7 December 200 I) The New Zealand 
Herald, Auckland, <http ://wwwnzheraldco.nz> (last accessed 27 August 2001). 
Lord Cooke of Thorndon "Final Appeal Courts: Some Comparisons" (New Zealand Centre 
for Public Law, Occasional Paper No 7, Dec 2001) 18-l 9. 
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Lord Cooke's suggestion is that the Supreme Court would consist of "a few 
permanent local judges and one or two overseas judges". 171 His Lordship's 
"cardinal reason" for using overseas judges was that they would bring to the court" 
a wider perspective, derived from a wider experience than the purely local one". As 
a fonner President of the Court of Appeal and a Law Lord, Lord Cooke's 
experience and suggestions should not be lightly disregarded. 
In his paper, Lord Cooke draws useful parallels with the Hong Kong Court of 
Final Appeal. That court was established on the tennination of British rule in the 
fonner colony and is constituted of four local judges and one overseas judge 
selected from a panel of nine. 172 The fact that the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal 
is so similar to the constitution I propose for the Supreme Court of New Zealand 
adds weight to my argument that such a system could work in New Zealand. 
The experience and ability of senior overseas appellate court judges from 
jurisdictions similar to New Zealand cannot be questioned. The prime source of 
judges would inevitably be from the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada: all 
jurisdictions on which the New Zealand places significant precedential value. They 
would bring an exceptionally useful depth of knowledge to the court and this 
reflects the current practice of Commonwealth judges sitting on the Judicial 
Committee. 
Support for the use of overseas judges also comes from the New Zealand Law 
Society.
173 
The Society considered that it was appropriate to "access the skill and 
171 
172 
173 
Lord Cooke of Thomdon "Final Appeal Courts: Some Comparisons" (New Zealand Centre 
for Public Law, Occasional Paper o 7, Dec 200 l ), 18. 
Lord Cooke of Thomdon "Final Appeal Courts: Some Comparisons" (New Zealand Centre 
for Public Law, Occasional Paper o 7, Dec 2001 ), 18-19. Lord Cooke points out that three 
former New Zealand judges are "overseas" judges on the Hong Kong panel: Lord Cooke, Sir 
Edward Somers and Sir Thomas Eichelbaum. 
Christine Grice "Submission to the Attorney-General in Response to the Discussion Paper 
'Reshaping New Zealand ' s Appeal Structure ' ", (New Zealand Law Society, undated) para 
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expertise of leading overseas jurists", and that the use of overseas judges might also 
meet the needs of Maori and the business community.174 The Society was 
concerned to ensure that a New Zealand judge should always preside and that there 
should be set criteria for selection of overseas judges. I agree with these points. 
I consider that it should be possible (although not mandatory) for the 
Supreme Court bench to include one overseas judge on the bench and I advocate 
the adoption of the Hong Kong method of using overseas judges, namely drawing 
judges from a panel as required. There would obviously be a great many practical 
issues to be worked through but these need not be set out in legislation, limiting 
that instead to the "enabling" provision that I have suggested below. 
The use of overseas judges would not only enable an intimate exchange of 
judicial ideas internationally, but would prevent the collegiality of the Supreme 
Court from diminishing into "cosiness". In any event, my other suggestions would 
mean that there would be less emphasis on the concept of collegiality, and more on 
avoiding stagnation. 
In practical terms, New Zealand judges could, for example, be seconded to 
the High Court of Australia and vice versa. It would also be possible to second an 
overseas judge where a Supreme Court judge was sick or to cover a vacancy due to 
retirement. However, there should always be five New Zealand judges of the 
Supreme Court even if this idea were implemented. This would ensure that the 
Supreme Court did not become reliant on overseas judges and could sit as a bench 
constituted entirely of New Zealand judges. 
17~ 
24. <http://www.nz-lawsoc.org.nz> (last accessed 27 August 2002). 
AJthough no detailed reasons were given. 
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I have considered how overseas judges should be selected and managed and 
in my view a panel of five overseas judges should be established. These judges 
should not be permanent members of the Supreme Court but used regularly on the 
bench to enable a wider perspective to be introduced to the decision making 
process. My suggestions for elections and non-lawyer judges would be unaffected 
by the use of overseas judges. 
I anticipate that overseas judges would be used for set periods of time rather 
than on particular cases. However, the necessary legislation can be quite simply 
stated with the detail being developed independently and set out in fonnal rules. I 
propose the following provision: 
XX Overseas judges - (I) There shall be a panel of five overseas 
judges, appointed by the Governor-General, each of whom shall, 
subject to the Supreme Court (Overseas Judges) Rules, be entitled to 
sit periodically as a member of the Supreme Court. 
(2) Only one overseas judge may sit as a member of the Supreme 
Court at any particular sitting. 
(3) The Supreme Court (Overseas Judges) Rules shall control and 
determine the use of overseas judges in the Supreme Court . 
J Particular issues with first bench 
Great care will need to be exercised in the appointment of the first bench. It 
seems an inescapable conclusion that all judges will need to be appointed 
simultaneously to the first bench and this may give the impression that those 
advising the Attorney-General could be biased. It would be possible, for example, 
to select judges on the basis of their previous pro-government policy stance in the 
past and the perception of a "loaded" bench must, at all costs, be avoided. The 
Court of Appeal and High Court benches comprise judges appointed over the years 
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on the recommendation of Attorneys-General of both major parties and, even if an 
accusation of bias could be made, it could not apply to all appointments over so 
many years. 
How then will the first bench be selected? Logically, they will be selected in 
the same way as High Court and Court of Appeal judges. This selection process has 
stood the test of time, but has also been criticised for the lack of representation of 
various sectors of society. 175 The important difference here is that the entire bench 
will be appointed at the same time. Although the appointment process is conducted 
on a strictly non-partisan basis and one trusts that political bias in appointments 
would not be a factor, that perception may emerge. In view of this, perhaps there 
should be, in the process of appointing the first bench, wider input before the 
Governor-General (on the advice of the Attorney-General) makes the appointments. 
This may also be an apposite time to revisit the issue of transparency in the judicial 
selection and appointment process. 
It may be that the answer would be to undertake wider consultation and this 
would also tend to satisfy the need for wider representation on the bench. Names of 
potential appointees could also be invited from the wider community and, as 
discussed above, need not be limited to the "traditional" places, namely the ranks 
of the senior legal practitioners. The major concern for the purposes of this paper is 
the appointment of the entire Supreme Court bench at one time, but the 
considerations here could also be utilised in future appointments. In this respect, 
the judicial elections that I advocate above may be advantageous in dispelling 
concerns of bias. 
A further option, that would avoid the entire bench being appointed 
simultaneously, would be to allow appointments to take place over a period of 
l 75 
Sir Geoffrey Palmer "Judicial selection and accountability: Can the New Zealand system 
survive?" (J 993 Legal Research Foundation Seminar, Auckland, 5-6 August 1993). 
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time. In the early stages, perhaps only the Chief Justice should be formally 
appointed to the Supreme Court bench, with the remaining judges being drawn 
from the Court of Appeal and, if required, from the High Court. This would have 
the benefit of giving the opportunity to "test" differently constituted benches and 
for the judges to decide whether they would wish to be appointed to the new bench. 
After all, the Supreme Court will be significantly different from the Court of 
Appeal, particularly in tenns of its workload and the "mature considerations" it is 
likely to engage in. This, of course, raises a great many problems, principally how 
it would work in practice and how it could be achieved without major disruptions 
on the lower courts. 
Using High Court or Court of Appeal judges as suggested above would have 
serious "knock on" effects in those courts, with High Court judges being required 
to be appointed to the Court of Appeal on a temporary basis to cover the temporary 
absences that would inevitably occur with Court of Appeal judges being seconded 
to the Supreme Court. On balance, this process would be very unwieldy and the 
opportunity of working relationships developing to any great extend in a bench so 
constituted would be significantly reduced as compared with a permanent bench. It 
would also prolong the period of uncertainty that would exist until a permanent 
bench was finally appointed and call into doubt the precedential value of decisions 
delivered during that time. 
There are also likely to be different dynamics in the Court of Appeal and the 
Supreme Court. For example, the Court of Appeal has an enormous workload 176 
and is often under pressure to produce decisions swiftly. On the other hand the 
Supreme Court, as envisaged, will hear only 40 to 50 appeals each year177 and so 
176 
177 
In 2001 the Court of Appeal heard a total of 593 appeals: Report of the Attorney-General ' s 
Advisory Group "Replacing the Privy Council: A ew Supreme Court" Office of the 
Attorney-General, Wellington, 2002, para 170. 
Report of the Attorney-General's Advisory Group "Replacing the Privy Council: A New 
Supreme Court" Office of the Attorney-General, Wellington, 2002, para 5. 
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will have a significant amount of time to reflect on the issues without the same 
pressures that are present in the Court of Appeal. Whether this would suit all judges 
is debatable. Concern has been expressed that the Supreme Court would, in fact, be 
under-utilised,
178 
a view shared by Lord Cooke. 179 If this were to be the case in 
practice it is easy to conceive that judges would find the work of the Supreme 
Court unfulfilling. There is then, a likelihood that different skills and abilities will 
be expected of Supreme Court judges and this will need to be a factor in selecting 
judges for that court. 
In practical terms, it seems then that the only option is for all the new 
Supreme Court judges to take office simultaneously. This would ensure that when 
the first appeal is heard by that court, all the judges are permanent members of that 
court. This will have the effect of both conveying that the bench is "the" Supreme 
Court and that there was no chance of a differently constituted bench coming to a 
different decision. 
There will, however, be enormous challenges in ensunng that the first 
Supreme Court bench appointments are well made and wide consultation will be 
necessary. It is very likely that the initial bench will remain for at least seven years 
if my suggestions are implemented and, short of any action justifying removal , the 
appointees will be the final arbiters of the law in New Zealand for that period. In 
addition, care must be taken not to decimate the current Court of Appeal by making 
appointments from that bench on the basis of their significant appellate experience. 
My suggestion for the first bench is to "promote" the current Chief Justice to 
the Supreme Court but on her current terms of judicial appointment to ensure that 
178 
179 
Report of the Attorney-General ' s Advisory Group "Replacing the Privy Council: A ew 
Supreme Court" Office of the Attorney-General, Wellington, 2002, para 84. 
Lord Cooke of Thorndon "Final Appeal Courts: Some Comparisons" (New Zealand Centre 
for Public Law, Occasional Paper No 7, Dec 2001) 20. 
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there would not be a Constitutionally embarrassing refusal of the Chief Justice to 
accept the position. On Elais CJ's retirement, the new Chief Justice should be 
appointed on the basis discussed above. The remaining four judges would be 
appointed for seven years at the outset and, despite future appointments occurring 
at the same time, eventually they would become staggered through, for example, 
judges reaching the mandatory retirement age or not being reappointed. The 
following provision would deal with this. 
XX Initial Judicial Appointments - (l) The Chief Justice of New 
Zealand shall be appointed as the President of the Supreme Court. This 
appointment shall be on the terms no less advantageous than those 
currently enjoyed by the Chief Justice. 
(2) On the retirement of the ChiefJustice described in subsection (l) or 
when that Chief Justice otherwise ceases to sit as a judge of the 
Supreme Court, the office of Chief Justice shall be filled in the manner 
set out in section XX [ the appointments provision, above] of this Act. 
(3) The remaining four judges of the Supreme Court shall be elected to 
the Supreme Court and section XX [the appointments provision, 
above] shall apply. 
K Maori representation 
The significant remammg question as to the constitution of the Supreme 
Court bench is what, if any, specific recognition should be afforded to Maori . It is 
abundantly evident that Maori are significantly underrepresented, as a proportion of 
the population, in both the legal profession generally and particularly in the 
judiciary. The higher up the court structure one progresses, the more evident the 
lack of Maori representation becomes. As alluded to above,180 retention of the 
180 ln the context of one of the arguments for retention of the Privy Council appeal . 
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Privy Council has been seen by many in the Maori community as desirable, 
particularly as that forum represents a direct link to the Crown and is seen therefore 
as particularly important in the context of appeals relating to the Treaty of 
Waitangi. There is also a perception that Maori receive a more sympathetic hearing 
from the Privy Council. 
Maori have been exceedingly concerned at the proposed abolition of the right 
of appeal to the Privy Council. 181 The argument is that the Privy Council is the last 
"link" to the Monarch and as such it is of great significance to Maori. There is also 
a perception that Maori receive a more favourable hearing before the Privy Council 
than before the New Zealand Courts, particularly in matters concerning the Treaty 
of Waitangi. However, there has never been Maori representation on the Privy 
Council and whether Maori actually received a more favourable hearing is open to 
debate. 182 Whether these arguments are well-founded are unlikely to sway the 
government in its decision to abolish the appeal, but they have certainly led to 
wider consultation than the insufficient effort criticised by Bennion in his article. 
These concerns were specifically addressed by the Advisory Group and the 
result was a reco1m11endation that Maori be represented on the Supreme Court 
bench by a judge well versed in the Maori language and culture. t 83 Whether this 
will be practical or desirable in practice is debatable. The question then arises as to 
whether this is an apt solution to Maori concerns or whether it is a token gesture to 
remove or reduce Maori opposition to abolition of the Privy Council appeal. If the 
181 
182 
183 
·These concerns are succinctly summarised in Tom Bennion "Waitangi Tribunal" (1996) Maori 
Law Rev (May) 3 
The Attorney-General counters the arguments put forward by Maori by pointing out that 
Maori have won few recent cases before the Privy Council, Privy Councillors are (in practice) 
appointed by the British Prime Minister (rather than the Queen personally) and the Privy 
Council frequently remits Treaty of Waitangi cases to the New Zealand Court of Appeal for 
final determination: Colin James "Scales of Justice in our hands with end of Privy Council" 
(16 April 2002) The New Zealand Herald, Auckland, <http ://wwwnzherald.co.nz> (last 
accessed 27 August 2002). 
Report of the Attorney-General ' s Advisory Group "Replacing the Privy Council: A New 
Supreme Court" Office of the Attorney-General, Wellington, 2002, para 59. 
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report is the result of wide consultation within Maoridom and this proposal 
represents the culmination of that process, then it may be apt to appoint such a 
person to the bench. However, if it is merely a convenient method of ensuring 
"representation" on the bench to appease Maori then it clearly is not appropriate. 
A nwnber of issues anse even if such representation 1s considered 
appropriate, and there seem to be more questions than answers. For example, is 
there going to always be an appropriate appointee, with sufficient skills and 
expertise, for appointment to the Supreme Court? It would be in nobody ' s interest 
to appoint a Supreme Court judge merely on the basis of his or her cultural 
heritage, or ability in Maori language and culture. What will the ongoing system of 
ensuring Maori representation be? If there is no appropriately qualified appointee 
available when the incwnbent Maori judge retires will a non-Maori judge be 
appointed? If so, for how long? Until a Maori appointee becomes available? It is 
readily evident that the appointment process will not be without difficulties. 
The main question for the purposes of this paper is whether the legislation 
should be drafted so as to require Maori representation or whether it should express 
Maori appointment on some sort of preferential basis. To place a positive duty on 
the Attorney-General to ensure that the Supreme Court always had at least one 
Maori judge may be too high a goal and perhaps it would be more realistic to 
express it as a desire. It could perhaps be extended to cover all judicial 
appointments to ensure Maori representation in the judiciary generally is more 
equitable. · I( would arguably be more beneficial to Maori to have greater 
representation in the lower courts than merely in the Supreme Court. Over time the 
nwnber of Maori judges would increase and there would be a greater "pool" of 
talent to draw from to sit on the higher benches. 
If the latter approach is adopted, more Maori appointments to all courts, it 
should be extended to encompass all major ethnic groups in New Zealand. In New 
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Zealand the population is truly multi-cultural. There may well be arguments that 
the Supreme Court should have a Maori representative, but that begs the question 
of whether there should be representation for other groups, for example Pacific 
Islanders or Asians. This would be a starting point to assist in achieving a judiciary 
that reflected the ethnic composition of New Zealand, although it would clearly go 
no distance towards reflecting its socio-economic structure. There can be no 
argument that this will take place only over a fairly extended period, particularly 
given the disproportionately low number of Maori , Pacific Islanders and Asians 
currently in both the legal and non-legal professions and thus available for 
appointment to the judiciary. 
As an alternative to appointment to the judiciary, there may be scope for the 
appointment of Maori advisers to the Supreme Court. This is already an option with 
respect to technical advisers to the Court of Appeal, but could easily be extended to 
cultural advisers (perhaps with a Maori lawyer being appointed as amicus curia). 
The difference from the current system would be that such advisers would be 
mandatory in cases involving Maori issues. Again this could be extended to include 
all cultural groups. It could also serve to improve the knowledge of the judiciary on 
cultural issues. 
My conclusion is that legislation to ensure Maori representation on the 
Supreme Court is not appropriate, but rather the appointment process184 should be 
overhauled to ensure a more representative cross section of the multicultural New 
Zealand population.185 In addition, the use of overseas judges may well serve to 
allay the fears of Maori. 
184 
185 
Or, if judicial elections are used, the candidature selection committee. 
The idea of a large Select Committee for this purpose has been suggested B V Harris, "The 
Law-Making Power of the Judiciary" in Philip A Joseph (ed) Essays on the Constitution 
(Brooker's, Wellington, 1995) 280 . 
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My inclination is that if Maori are to achieve more representation in the 
judicial system, it must be on the basis of a change to the appointment process in 
all courts. Making special provision for Maori only in the Supreme Court will not 
assist in the long run. What is required is a wholesale change to the appointment 
system to ensure an equitable reflection of the community in the judiciary 
generally. I anticipate that this would include representatives from the Maori, 
Pacific Island and Asian communities, as well as the "traditional" sources of 
appointment. The extension to the pool of potential judicial appointees to include 
non-lawyers would also be of assistance in assisting these groups to achieve more 
equitable representation in the judiciary. 
VIII CONCLUSION 
The abolition of the right of appeal to Her Majesty in Council and the 
decision to establish a New Zealand Supreme Court to fill that void presents New 
Zealand with a golden opportunity to rethink its appellate court structure. The 
discussion above shows that there are many options available either alone or in 
combination and the fact that a particular process has not been tried before should 
be no inhibition to its consideration. 
The major issues to be addressed in the implementation of the suggestions in 
this paper are how limited term appointments to the Supreme Court could be made 
to work in practice and whether judicial elections would be a viable option. I am 
acutely aware that judges are currently appointed until retirement and the concept 
of a limited tenn appointment to the Supreme Court would inevitably attract little 
interest from that group, unless they were able to return to their previous judicial 
office, and even then it would be likely perceived as a demotion. Similarly with 
judicial elections. 
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The corollary is that one of the following propositions must apply: 
The judicial selection and appointment (or election) processes discussed in 
this paper must be applied to all courts. All appointments would then be 
made on the same basis and there would be no reason why candidates 
would be deterred. 
The salary and appointment conditions of Supreme Court judges should be 
made so attractive as to compensate for the "risk" of only remaining in 
office for seven years. 
The Supreme Court will attract a different "type" of potential appointee to 
the traditional judicial appointees. The introduction of non-legally qualified 
and overseas judges and limited term appointments would attract the type of 
appointees that would be willing to make a shorter term contribution to the 
judiciary and then return to practice. 
The concepts discussed in this paper are simply rejected and appointments 
to the Supreme Court are made in the same way as they are currently made 
to the High Court and the Court of Appeal. 
However, careful thought should be g1ven before resorting to the final 
proposition listed. In establishing the Supreme Court of New Zealand, the best of 
what other jurisdictions have developed over the years may be utilised and 
combined with innovative local ideas. If the suggestions contained in this paper 
were to be adopted, the new court could include judges from overseas appellate 
courts and from professions other than the law, as well as judges elected on a fixed 
term basis. 
This paper is not intended to be a blueprint for the Supreme Court but rather 
an exploration of some of the possibilities that exist to innovate and develop a 
uniquely New Zealand method of constituting the Supreme Court. What is crucially 
important at this planning stage is to ensure that the issues are fully explored and 
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wide consultation is undertaken both within the judiciary and, perhaps more 
importantly, the wider community. 
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